
COMPANY TRAINING 



MOSS 



, W^V*"*"*' 




Class Ulh^ 
Book ^% 3 



Copyright^ . 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT; 



COMPANY TRAINING 

In the Attack, and the Defense, including 
the Field Orders of Enlisted Men 



By 

MAJOR JAMES A> MOSS 
U. S. Army 



Price 50 cents 




^6 



Publishers 
GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY 

Menasha, Wisconsin 



: 
PREFATORY 

Because of the prominence in the press of the country 
and elsewhere that has been given to the special and 
abnormal kind of trench warfare that has developed on 
the western front in Europe, it is feared that some of us 
may allow ourselves to be misled into coming to the con- 
clusion that it is necessary to train and instruct our men 
in trench warfare only, and pay little or no attention to 
open fighting. 

It may be remarked in this connection the British 
made this mistake, but experience soon showed them 
their error, and now their officers and men are trained in 
open fighting as well as in trench warfare. Let us not 
repeat the British mistake — and let us also bear in mind 
that in war it is often the unexpected that happens, and 
no one knows what day the greater part of the work of 
our expeditionary forces will consist of open fighting. 

This little book deals with the training and instruc- 
tion of a company in open fighting. 




Camp Gaillard, C. Z., 
July 30, 1917. 



©CU 4 77530 

NOV 1313/7 



jv^ Copyright 1917 

By 

J as. A. Moss 



DISTRIBUTERS 

: UNITED STATES: 
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Chicago, HI. E. A. Armstrong Mfg. Co., 434-440 Wabash Ave. 
Columbus, Ohio. The M. C. Lilley & Co. 
Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 

U. S. Cavalry Association. 

Book Department, Army Service Schools. 
Fort Monroe, Va. Journal IT. S. Artillery. 
Kalamazoo, Mich. Henderson-Ames Co. 
Menasha, Wis. Geo. Banta Publishing Co. 
, Kew York. 

Edwin N. Appleton, 1 Broadway. 

Army and Navy Cooperative Co., 16 East 42nd St. 

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Philadelphia, Pa. Jacob Eeed's Sons, 1424 Chestnut. 
San Francisco, Cal. 

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Washington, D. C. 

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HAWAIIAN ISLANDS; Patten Co., Ltd., Honolulu, H. T. 
CANAL ZONE: Post Exchange, Empire, C. Z. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

THE COMPANY IN ATTACK Pars. 

The importance of the attack — Rules and principles of attack — 
Plan for illustrating the application of these rules and principles — 
The five stages of the attack 1-19 

CHAPTER II 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE ATTACK 
The advance of the company under hostile artillery fire, but 
not yet near enough to the enemy to be subjected to his infantry 
fire 20-28a 

CHAPTER III 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE ATTACK 
The advance of the company under artillery, and long-range 
infantry fire 29-43 

CHAPTER IV 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 
THE THIRD STAGE OF THE ATTACK 
The struggle for superiority of fire over the enemy 44-49 

CHAPTER V 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

THE FOURTH STAGE OF THE ATTACK 
The advance after superiority of fire has been gained to a posi- 
tion close enough to charge 50-57 

CHAPTER VI 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

THE FIFTH STAGE OF THE ATTACK 
The Charge 58-67 

CHAPTER VII 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 
THE COUNTER-ATTACK 68-70 

CHAPTER VIII 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 
MEETING ENGAGEMENT, IN WHICH THE COMPANY IS 
EXPOSED TO BOTH ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY FIRE 
FROM THE BEGINNING 71-74 



CHAPTER IX Pars. 

THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

ADVANCE-GUARD ACTION 75-79 

CHAPTER X 

THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE 
GENERAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES 80-101 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE 

USUAL TYPES OP DEFENSE. 102-110 

CHAPTER XII 

THE COMPANY ON OUTPOST 
ESTABLISHING THE OUTPOST.. Ill 

CHAPTER XIII 
FIELD ORDERS CF ENLISTED MEN 

Platoon leaders — Guides — Squad leaders — Buglers — Privates 112-123 



Chapter I* 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ATTACK RULES AND PRINCI- 
PLES OF ATTACK PLAN FOR ILLUSTRATING THE 

APPLICATION OF THESE RULES AND 

PRINCIPLES THE FIVE STAGES 

OF THE ATTACK 

1. Importance of the Attack. Decisive results are 
obtained only by the offensive. Aggressiveness wins bat- 
tles. (Par. 121, Field Service Regulations.) Indeed, it 
may be said there is but one way to win battles, and that is 
by attacking, by going after the other fellow with ham- 
mer and tongs. The defense, the service of security, and 
the service of information are important only because, 
with an efficient commander, they are merely means that 
enable him to bring every possible man in the best pos- 
sible condition, physically and morally, on the field of 
battle at a vital point, and there attack the enemy with a 
smashing force and determination that will drive him 
from the field in defeat. This is really the greatest 
principle of war, and it applies to squads as well as to 
armies. 

Of course, it is easier to defend, to sit back and wait 
for developments, but, remember, that such tactics never 
have won, nor ever will win battles. 

Let every officer, noncommissioned officer, and pri- 
vate become imbued with the dominating spirit of attack, 

*Chapters I to XI are based on "Company Training," by General Haking, 
of the British Army, which is the best book the author has ever seen on the 
subject of company training. 

[7] 



2-3 

realizing that the best way to defeat the enemy, is to 
"go after" him, and to do so with your whole heart and 
soul — as if you meant it. Strike hard with the utmost 
speed and force and keep on striking to the limit of 
human endurance. 

A famous general once said a soldier should know 
three things: First, obedience; second, obedience; third, 
obedience. This might well be changed to, "First, attack ; 
second, attack; third, attack." 

Rules and Principles of Attack 

2. Advantages of the Attack. The attackers can 
choose the point of attack, while the defenders must be 
prepared to resist at all points. The fact of advancing in 
spite of the defenders' fire gives the attackers the idea 
they are succeeding, and on the other hand it gives the 
defenders the idea that the other fellows are getting the 
better of them. Another moral advantage is that the 
attackers leave their dead and wounded behind them as 
they advance, while the casualties of the defenders 
usually remain in the trenches and the defenders must 
undergo the demoralizing ordeal of fighting amongst 
them. 

3. Superiority of Fire. It is an established fact in 
modern warfare that it is impossible to shoot an enemy 
out of an entrenched position — he must be driven out 
with the bayonet. Now, there is only one way you can 
get near enough to his position to charge it and drive 
him out, and that is by keeping down his fire, which you 
can do only by gaining and maintaining what is called 
"Superiority of flre. ,, We, therefore, see that "Superi- 

[8] 



4-5-6 
ority of Fire" is the key to the situation. Remember, 
the more effective your fire is, the less effective will that 
of the enemy be. 

4. Do not Open Fire Until it is Absolutely 
Necessary — that is to say, continue to advance without 
firing as long as you can do so without ruinous losses. 
Remember, you must husband your ammunition as much 
as possible for the struggle for superiority of fire that is 
yet to come, and remember, too, after the attack begins 
the chances are you will not be able to get airy more 
ammunition that day, except what may be gotten from 
the dead and wounded, and what is brought by the sup- 
ports when they come up to reenforce the firing line. It 
is very demoralizing to the enemy to see you continue 
your advance on him without even returning his fire. 

Make every effort by using cover or inconspicuous 
formations to arrive, if you possibly can, to within about 
800 yards of the enemy before opening fire. 

5. Direction of Advance. Get the direction in 
which you are to advance well fixed in your mind and, 
when operating with other companies, do not change it; 
for, if you do, you will interfere with the companies on 
your right or left. You may be tempted to change the 
direction of your advance so as to take advantage of a 
more covered approach, but, with other companies on 
your right and left, this will result in confusion. 

6. Deployment. Do not deploy until it is neces- 
sary to do so. If the cover will enable you to do so, do 
not deploy until you get within effective rifle ran^e of 
the enemy. Deployed troops are unwieldy and difficult 
to handle as compared with those in close order. 

[9] 



7-8-9-10-11 

7. Who Indicates the Point or Time for Opening 
Fire. The major should indicate the point or time for 
opening fire. He may do this in his order for deploy- 
ment or he may follow the firing line close enough to 
give the order at the proper time. If it be impracticable 
for him to do so, the senior officer of the battalion with 
the firing line selects the time for opening fire. 

8. Assignment of the Objective. At the begin- 
ning of the attack the major assigns the objective. Unless 
a particular target has been assigned the company, it 
takes as its target that part of the general objective which 
lies in its front. 

9. Protection of Flanks. Flanks must always be 
protected, and their protection is the duty of the com- 
manders of all flank units down to the lowest, whether 
specifically enjoined in orders or not. 

10. Close with the Enemy as soon as Possible; 

the longer you delay doing so, the longer will you be 
under his fire and consequently the greater will be your 
casualties. 

11. Size of the Fractions that Rush. In the 
rushes, make the advancing fractions as large as the 
hostile fire -and the necessity for maintaining superiority 
of fire, will permit. Remember, the smaller the rushing 
fractions are, the slower will the advance be — the longer 
will you be exposed to the enemy's fire and consequently 
the greater will your casualties be. The size of the rush- 
ing fraction will, of course, depend upon the cover 
available, the volume and accuracy of the hostile fire and 
other circumstances. It may sometimes be advisable to 
begin the rushes with a company and then change to half 



12-13-14-15 

a company or platoon, and finally to a squad or file. No 
opportunity should be lost to increase the size of the rush- 
ing fraction. 

12. Rushes to be Made Under Covering Fire. 
Every rush must be made under the covering fire of the 
adjoining fraction or fractions. As a fraction is about to 
rush forward the adjoining fraction or fractions must 
increase the rate of fire ; for, when the enemy sees a frac- 
tion rushing forward he will very likely increase his fire, 
and we must keep it down as much as possible. 

The commander of the fraction that is about to rush 
should not start until the remainder of the line is deliver- 
ing a vigorous fire, and if necessary, he should, in case 
of delay, call out to the commanders of the adjoining 
fraction or fractions to increase their fire. 

13. Length of Rushes. The length of the rush 
generally varies from 30 to 80 yards, depending upon the 
existence of cover, positions for firing, and the volume 
and accuracy of the hostile fire. 

14. Companies to be Kept Closed on Their 
Centers. In order to facilitate control by the company 
commander, also to provide intervals on the firing line 
in which reinforcements may be placed, the company 
must be kept closed in on its center as it becomes depleted 
by casualties ; for, squads and other units coming up from 
the support should take their place on the firing line in 
their entirety and should not be divided up and mingled 
with the individuals of the line. 

15. Fixing Bayonets for the Assault. The major 
or senior officer in the firing line decides when bayonets 
shall be fixed, and gives the proper order or signal, which 

[in 



16-17-18 

is repeated by all parts of the tiring line. Bayonets are 
generally fixed before or during the last, or second last 
advance preceding the charge. 

16. The Charge. The firing line having reached 
the position from which the charge is to be made, the 
major causes the "Charge" to be sounded, and the signal 
is repeated by all the musicians. The company officers 
lead the charge, and the skirmishers spring forward 
shouting, running with bayonets at charge, and closing 
with the enemy. 

The support fixes bayonets when the firing line does. 

17. After the Charge. The conduct of the charg- 
ing troops after the charge will depend upon circum- 
stances ; they may halt and engage in bayonet combat or 
in pursuing fire; they may advance a short distance to 
obtain a field of fire, or to drive the enemy from the 
vicinity; they may assemble, or they may reorganize to 
repel a counter-attack by the enemy. 

18. Plan for Illustrating the Application of the 
Rules and Principles of Attack. The application of 
the rules and principles of attack will be shown by taking 
the company through the following types of attack, 
which constantly occur in war: 

1st. The company forming a part of a larger force 
that is attacking an enemy occupying a defensive posi- 
tion, the attacking force being compelled to advance for 
a considerable distance exposed only to hostile artillery 
fire, and subsequently to both artillery and infantry fire 
before the assault can be delivered. This is what may be 
called the stereotyped form of attack. 

[12] 



19 

2nd. Same as above, excepting that the company is 
exposed to both artillery and infantry fire from the 
beginning. ("Meeting engagement.") 

3rd. The advance guard attack. 

4th. The company, originally on the defense, goes 
out and attacks a force that has been attacking it. 

19. The Five Stages of the Attack. The follow- 
ing diagram shows the five stages of the stereotyped 
form of attack. This simple outline of attack should 
be well fixed in the mind of every man in the company: 



[13] 



19 (contd.) 

FIRST STAGE 

(advance of the company under artillery 
fire, but not yet near enough to the enemy to 
be subjected to his infantry fire. ) 
Leading Features: 

Formations to be adopted ; use of cover ; pace in 
advancing; selection of halting-places; artillery 
action. 

SECOND STAGE 

(ADVANCE OF THE COMPANY UNDER BOTH ARTIL- 
LERY AND LONG-RANGE INFANTRY FIRE. ) 

Leading Features: 
The selection of fire-positions ; the use of cover- 
ing fire. 

THIRD STAGE 
(STRUGGLE FOR SUPERIORITY OF FIRE.) 

Leading Features: 
Fire direction; fire control; fire discipline. 

FOURTH STAGE 
(ADVANCE AFTER SUPERIORITY OF FIRE HAS 
BEEN GAINED TO A POSITION CLOSE ENOUGH TO 
CHARGE THE ENEMY.) 

Leading Features: 
Maintenance of superiority of fire; rapid ad- 
vance. 

FIFTH STAGE 
(THE CHARGE.) 

Leading Features: 
A vigorous, simultaneous rush with a heavy line. 



[14] 



19 (contd.) 

When does one stage of the attack end and the other 
begin? 

Of course, the lines of demarcation between the dif- 
ferent stages of the attack are not sharp and well-defined, 
like the lines on a tennis court, for instance, but the dif- 
ferent stages gradually blend into one another. How- 
ever, each stage has its own characteristics, its own "ear- 
marks," and there will be no trouble in recognizing them. 

For Example : 

First Stage. As long as we are subjected to only 
artillery fire we are in the first stage. 

Second Stage. When the first rifle bullets begin to 
whiz through the air, we then know the first stage is end- 
ing and the second commencing. 

Third Stage. When we commence to see that, 
because of the enemy's infantry fire, we are beginning 
to advance more slowly, we then know that the second 
stage is ending and the third is beginning. And when 
we find that it is impossible to advance any further unless 
we can reduce the enemy's infantry fire, we know that 
the third stage has been reached, and that the struggle 
for superiority of fire is on. 

Fourth Stage. When the enemy's infantry fire 
begins to subside and we find that we are able to resume 
the advance, we then know that we are gaining superi- 
ority of fire — that is to say, the fourth stage has been 
reached, and we must now advance to a fire position close 
enough to the enemy to enable us to charge from it. 

Fifth Stage. The charge. 



Cis] 



20-21-22 



Chapter II 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE ATTACK 

THE ADVANCE OF THE COMPANY UNDER HOSTILE ARTIL- 
LERY FIRE, BUT NOT YET NEAR ENOUGH TO THE 
ENEMY TO BE SUBJECTED TO HIS 
INFANTRY FIRE 

20. The Situation. Let us suppose the company 
is assembled under cover of some hill or wood from four 
to five thousand yards from the enemy's position, which 
we are going to attack and that as soon as the company 
leaves this cover and begins to advance, it will be fired 
upon by the hostile artillery, but not by the infantry. 
Let us suppose, further, that we are taking part in a 
big battle, and consequently have other companies on our 
right and left and also supports and reserves in rear. 

21. Importance of the Attack. Impress upon the 
company the importance of the attack (see Par. 638). 

22. The Object of this Stage of the Attack. 

What are we trying to do when the company commences 
the attack? We are going to try to smash the enemy — to 
attack him so quickly and vigorously that we will drive 
him from his position in confusion and disorder. The 
enemy is entrenched, and experience has shown that you 
can't shoot an enemy out of trenches — you've got to get 
close in on him and drive him out with the bayonet, but 
before we can do this we will have a long way to go. In 

[16] 



23 

the beginning of our advance, which we will call the first 
stage of the attack, we will probably be subjected only 
to artillery fire, and will be too far away to use our rifles 
with effect. Our immediate object then, is to get over 
ground in our immediate front as rapidly as possible and 
without losing any more men than we can help. 

Before the company goes into action always tell the 
men: 

1st. The point of attack. 

2nd. The general situation — whether there are any 
of our troops to the front, on our flank or rear. 

3rd. What part the company is to take in the 
fight — whether to form part of the firing line, the sup- 
port or the reserve. 

If the men know these things, they will be able to act 
more intelligently, especially in case of confusion on 
separation from the rest of the company. 

HOW TO ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECT 

23. The Pace. We will suppose that there are 
large patches of open ground in front of us, which the 
enemy can see from his position, and which he can fire 
upon effectively with his artillery. We can not avoid 
these open patches, because we are taking part in an ex- 
tensive attack, with other companies on our right and 
left, and if each company changed its original direction 
of advance and sought a more covered approach, con- 
fusion and disorder would result. 

Let us consider the ground. Some of it will be open 
and exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, and some of it 
will be hidden from his view and merely exposed to badly - 

[17] 



23 (contd.) 

aimed artillery fire, or what is called "searching fire," 
but which is rarely effective. The result is that during 
this stage of the attack the company will be advancing a 
part of the time over open and exposed ground and a 
part of the time over ground that is hidden from the 
enemy's view and fire. Of course, we want to advance 
as rapidly as possible; for, apart from the advantage of 
rapidity and vigor in the attack, which alarms the enemy 
almost as much as our bullets and shells, the less time 
it takes us to cover the ground in front of us, the less 
time will we be under the enemy's fire. But there are 
two things that will hinder the rapidity of our advance: 
first, we must not exhaust the men at this early stage of 
the fight by too rapid an advance, because if we do they 
will not be in the best condition to continue the fight when 
they are close enough to the enemy to use their rifles. 
Secondly, the enemy's artillery is apt to stop us, because 
if, when we are crossing an exposed area the sky above us 
suddenly becomes full of bursting shells, it is the natural 
inclination of the ordinary human being to lie down and 
wait until the fire slackens. This means loss of time, and 
it is also just what the enemy's gunners want, as it gives 
them a stationary target to shoot at. As we all know, it 
is much easier, especially with artillery, to shoot at a 
stationary target than at a moving one. We, therefore, 
see that the company must- — 

1st. Halt occasionally to rest the men, and select, 
when possible, halting places which are not exposed to 
the enemy's artillery fire. 

2nd. Advance as rapidly as possible over places 
that are exposed to fire, and resist the temptation to lie 
down, if suddenly it comes under a burst of artillery fire. 

[18] 



24-25 
From this it follows that the company must move at 
a run over exposed ground, and walk or halt if neces- 
sary, in order to rest the men when reaching covered 
ground. 

24. Use of the Weapon. As we are at this stage 
of the attack too far away from the enemy's position to 
use our rifles with effect, to do any firing now would 
merely mean a waste of ammunition, every round of 
which, as you will see, we will need later on. 

25. Formations. We must select a formation 
which is the most difficult for the enemy's artillery to hit, 
and which at the same time will permit the immediate 
use of the rifle, should the situation change and the 
enemy suddenly appear within rifle range. 

Our Drill Regulations describe the three following 
formations, any one of which, depending upon circum- 
stances, may be used during this stage of the attack : 

1. Platoon Columns, which are used when, due 
either to difficult ground or limited cover, there are only 
a few favorable routes of advance; no two platoons 
should march within the burst of a single shrapnel 
(ordinarily about 20 yards wide). Aside from the ad- 
vantage of enabling the whole company to use the few 
favorable routes, this formation also enables the captain 
to maintain control over the company. 

2. Squad Columns, which are of value principally 
in facilitating the advance over rough or brush-broken 
ground. They afford no material advantage in secur- 
ing cover. While the captain's control over the company 
in squad columns is somewhat less than in platoon 

[19] 



26 

column, still it is greater than when the company is de- 
ployed as skirmishers. 

3. A succession of thin lines, which is used in cross- 
ing a wide stretch swept by artillery fire, or by a heavy, 
long-range rifle fire which cannot be profitably returned. 
This method results in a serious (though temporary) 
loss of control over the company. It also takes up time. 
Its advantage lies in the fact that it offers a less definite 
target. 

The two disadvantages of the skirmish line are — 

1st, It offers to the hostile artillery a target that 
is a continuous straight line, and consequently simplifies 
the question of range. 

2nd. It results in a loss of control over the company. 
It should not, therefore, as a rule, be used until we are 
ready or about ready to open fire. 

26. The Hostile Artillery. This, the first stage of 
attack, may be called the "Artillery Stage." Infantry- 
men should remember that the effect of artillery fire is 
moral rather than physical. Comparatively few of the 
casualties in a battle are caused by the artillery — the man 
who is really to be feared is the "dough boy" — he's the 
one who does the deadly work. 

A shell contains just enough powder to burst the 
case and not sufficient to send the bullets flying in all 
directions with a velocity sufficient to damage seriously 
anyone standing at a distance. 

The velocity of the bullets in the shell depends upon 
the rate the shell is flying through the air at the moment 
it explodes, and the bullets soon lose their velocity. 
Should a shell, for instance, burst 200 yards in front of 

[20] 



27 
a soldier and one of the bullets should hit him, it would 
do him no serious injury, because it has not sufficient 
velocity left to penetrate his clothes and skin. A soldier 
is, therefore, practically safe 200 yards away from a shell 
that bursts directly in front of him. We see from this 
that a shell that bursts on the ground produces little or 
no damage — the shell must not only burst in the air, but 
it must burst in just exactly the right place. This is 
accomplished by putting a time fuse in the shell. A 
mistake of only one second in the cutting of the time 
fuse will, at 3500 yards, make a difference of about 120 
yards. The rate that the shell travels is affected materi- 
ally by the density of the air. It usually takes an artil- 
leryman from five to ten minutes to find the range — so, 
we need expect no serious damage, except from a chance 
shot, for five or ten minutes after the artillery opens up 
on us, unless, of course, the gunners have gotten the 
range beforehand. 

27. Localities to be Avoided. The enemv's artil- 

m> 

lery generally picks out certain localities where it appears 
likely a target will appear, and ascertains the range and 
determines the proper fuse cutting beforehand, so that 
they can open at once a heavy and effective fire on any 
troops that may appear in those localities. Clumps of 
trees, edges of woods, exits from defiles, and approaches 
to bridges, are amongst the most common of such locali- 
ties. Any object that is fairly isolated and stands up 
well, such as a building, a hay stack, etc., is an excellent 
object for the artillery to range upon, and if they have 
not ascertained the range and cut the fuse beforehand, 
they can do so very rapidly with such rangcmarks. Such 
localities should, therefore, be avoided, if possible, but 

[21] 



28-28a 

if, as is usually the case, this is out of the question, then 

they should be passed as rapidly as possible. 

28. Our Artillery. Of course, during this stage of 
the attack our own artillery is helping us to advance by 
keeping down the hostile artillery as much as possible. 
Our artillery has these advantages over the hostile artil- 
lery:— 

1st. It has only one target (the hostile artillery) to 
fire at, while the hostile artillery has two (our artillery 
and our advancing infantry). 

2nd. Our artillery has a stationary target, while the 
hostile artillery has a moving target. 

3rd. Our artillery can disperse their guns and con- 
centrate their fire much more than the enemy, since the 
latter are tied down to practically the position selected 
for defense, whereas we have the whole country to the 
front and flanks in which we can place our guns. 

28a. Conclusion. We, therefore, see that during 
this stage of the attack we are opposed only by the hostile 
artillery, over which, gun for gun, our own artillery 
possesses certain advantages, and consequently the ene- 
my's artillery will probably be kept pretty busy looking 
after the attacking artillery. 

Our object must be to cross an}^ area exposed to 
the enemy's artillery as rapidly as possible, halting in 
places that afford cover, and taking advantage of any 
temporary cessation of artillery fire to rush over excep- 
tionally exposed ground, thus avoiding a number of 
casualties, and thereby adding to the confidence of our 
men, whom we shall keep fresh, and thus bring them up 
to the second stage of the attack in excellent condition 
for the decisive fighting which is now approaching. 

[22] 



29-30 



Chapter III 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

The Second Stage of the Attack 

THE ADVANCE OF THE COMPANY UNDER ARTILLERY AND 
LONG-RANGE INFANTRY FIRE 

29. Beginning of the Stage. The beginning of 
the second stage of the attack is marked by the sound of 
the enemy's rifle bullets and the desire of our own men 
to return the fire. 

30. Ammunition. However, everything possible 
must be done to have the company advance as far as we 
can without returning the enemy's fire; for, our fire 
would at this range be ineffective and would merely be 
a waste of ammunition, every round of which we will, as 
you will see, need later on. One of the few advantages 
of the defense is that the trenches can be filled with 
ammunition before the fight begins, or ammunition in 
unlimited quantity can be brought up during the battle. 
The defense can, therefore, afford to waste a certain 
amount of ammunition in long-range firing, but it is 
quite different with us whose ammunition supply is 
practically limited to what we have taken into the fight 
on our persons. However, we have a compensating 
moral advantage of the enemy's seeing that his fire is so 
ineffective that we do not even condescend to return it, 
and that we are coming right after him. Another moral 
advantage the attacker has over the defender, is that it's 
much more trying to remain in one place while the other 

[23] 



31 

fellow is hitting than it is to be hitting. This is human 
nature. As the fight progresses the company com- 
mander must keep himself informed as to the condition 
of the supply of ammunition. "Company commanders 
are responsible that the belts of the men in their com- 
panies are kept filled at all times, except when the ammu- 
nition is being expended in action. In the fire line the 
ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured 
whenever practicable." (Par. 550, Infantry Drill Regu- 
lations. ) 

"Ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be 
expended first. Thirty rounds in the right pocket section 
of the belt mil be held as a reserve, to be expended only 
when ordered by an officer." (Par. 551, Infantry Drill 
Regulations. ) 

"Men will never be sent back from the firing line for 
ammunition. Men sent forward with ammunition re- 
main with the firing line." (Par. 552, Infantry Drill 
Regulations. ) 

According to the Field Service Regulations each 
man armed with a rifle carries 220 rounds of ammunition 
into battle — 100 rounds in his belt and two bandoleers 
containing 60 rounds each. The bandoleers are dis- 
tributed from the battalion combat wagon just before 
the troops go into action. 

31. Deployment. The first sound of the enemy's 
bullets will be our signal to deploy as skirmishers; for 
we cannot afford to advance within zone of effective rifle 
fire in any column formation, lest a single shot might 
put two or more men out of business. 

[24] 



82-33-34 

32. Object of this Stage of the Attack. The ob- 
ject of this stage of the attack is to advance with the loss 
of as few men as possible to a fire position close enough 
to the enemy to enable us to use our rifles with such 
accuracy that we will be able to gain superiority of fire 
which may be said to be three-fourths of the battle. 

33. How to Accomplish our Object. We will, 
in general terms, accomplish our object by endeavoring 
to find resting-places under cover after long rushes to 
enable the men to regain their breath, by finding fire- 
positionjs from which an effective fire can be delivered, 
and by advancing as rapidly as is consistent with safety, 
without exhausting the energies of our men. 

34. The Use and Selection of Fire-Positions. It 

does not follow we should stop and fire from any good 
fire-position that happens to be in front of us. The dis- 
tance between fire-positions should be as great as possible 
without exhausting the men in rushing over the distance. 
The more fire-positions we occupy the longer will it take 
us to advance, and the more will we be subjected to the 
enemy's fire. And again, if an estimate could be made 
of the comparative casualties, it would probably be found 
that more men are killed and wounded while halted in 
fire-positions than while rushing from fire-position to 
fire-position. It is, therefore, very important that our 
platoon and squad leaders should be well trained in the 
selection and use of fire-positions. Whenever practicable 
the sights should be adjusted and the magazines filled 
before coming up to a fire-position, so that fire may be 
opened at once. For instance, if the company, platoon, 
or squad were about to emerge from a wood or other 

[25] 



35-36 

cover, and the next fire-position were known, the sights 
should be adjusted and the magazines filled before leav- 
ing cover. 

35. Good Fire-Positions. Whether or not a loca- 
tion is a good fire-position depends on whether it affords 
cover, and at the same time enables one to see the enemy, 
and depends, therefore, entirely upon the small features 
of the ground and any artificial cover that may be en- 
countered. For example, a position just behind the crest 
of a hill, behind a bank of any kind, or a fold in the 
ground, from which the enemy can be seen, is a good 
fire-position. 

A bank running along a road is a good fire-position, 
but it has the disadvantage, because of the road itself, 
of being a pretty good mark for the enemy's fire. If 
there is a bank and ditch on both sides of the road, it is 
better to occupy the position on the far side; for, the 
hostile infantry will doubtless fire at the road and bullets 
striking its hard surface will ricochet, while those striking 
in front of the far bank will disappear. 

Bushes and Undergrowth that have no clearly defined 
border that makes them an easy target, are good fire- 
positions. While it is true they do not afford protection 
from fire, they conceal the attackers. If the bushes are 
on the side of a hill, they then make better fire-positions, 
as the men can then see over the bushes better without 
being themselves exposed. 

36. Bad Fire-Positions. The following are bad 
fire-positions : — 

Hedges without Cover from Fire. A hedge without 
cover from fire is a bad fire-position, not only because it 

[26] 



36 (contd.) 
affords a good target for both the hostile artillery and 
infantry, but also because it is not always an easy posi- 
tion to advance out of. A hedge, however, could be used 
to advantage if the ground in the rear rises slightly, or 
if the enemy's position is on high ground in front, in 
which case the men lying down a short distance in rear 
on the open ground, could see over the top of the hedge, 
but themselves be hidden from view. 

Villages, farms, cottages, etc. As a rule any kind 
of a building or inclosure, such as a village, farm, or cot- 
tage, is a bad fire-position in the attack. They are easy 
to get into, but hard to get out of; they are often sub- 
jected to artillery fire, and the casualties are much 
heavier than out in the open. 

Quarries and gravel pits, although possibly afford- 
ing a good fire-position for a few men, are generally 
disastrous when occupied by a large number. While it 
is usually easy to jump down into such places and get 
temporary shelter, it is very difficult to climb out and 
continue the attack. When such a place is encountered, 
the best thing to do is for the squad or platoon that 
strikes it to occupy a fire-position behind it, and thus 
provide covering fire for the forward movement of the 
other units on the right and left of it. 

Fire- positions that are not approximately parallel 
to the front of the attack are a source of trouble that 
often leads to a loss of direction. Such positions are 
generally to be found in the form of a bank, a hedge, 
ridge, or the border of a wood. If such a position is 
recognized before actual occupation, company and pla- 
toon commanders must take special steps to avoid the 

[27] 



36 (contd.) 

mistakes that are likely to occur. To begin with, the 
true direction of the attack should be carefully noted, 
and steps taken to maintain it. It is impossible to give 
a fixed rule for the handling of all positions that are not 
parallel to the front of the attack. However, the fol- 
lowing principles are general in their application, and 
together with the examples given, should assist one 
materially in handling other cases of the same general 
nature : 

First Principle. Every effort must be made to pre* 
vent the occupation of a position that is enfiladed by the 
enemy. The reason for this is self-evident. 

Second Principle. If necessary to occupy a fire- 
position that is not practically parallel to the front of the 
attack, occupy first that part which is nearest to the 
enemy. The reason for this is that if the farther portion 
is occupied first, there will be a natural tendency on the 
part of the attack to pass the remainder of the portion 
and come up in line with the leading platoon or squad, 
whereas, if the nearest portion is occupied first, it is prac- 
tically certain that the men who are holding it will stay 
there until other troops come up on their outer flank; 
and these troops, with equal certainty, will conform to 
the fire position already established, and thus throw out 
the direction of the attack. 

Third Principle. If the part of the fire-position 
nearest the enemy has been occupied, do not occupy the 
remainder at all; or, if human nature is too strong to 
prevent this, then occupy it for as short a time as possible. 

Example 1. An open ridge or undulation of ground 
that runs diagonally left to right from our front, towards 

[28] 



36 (contd.) 
the enemy's position and falls gradually to the ordinary 
level some sice hundred yards from that position. 

Let us suppose that the ridge lies in front of an entire 
battalion. 



E M E: *\ y 



e n e m y ' 



s.$ 









N* r 






ti 



y 






*v-r. 



.J* 



n 



ATTACKfRS ATTACKERS 

WHAT WE- 5H0UL0 NOT DO. "WHAT WE; SHOULD DO 

Fig. 1 

(Fig. 1.) The company on the right, advancing 
ahead of the others, would go right over the end of the 
ridge nearest the enemy and occupy a fire-position be- 
yond, parallel to the front of the attack. The company 
on the left of the first would do the same upon reaching 
the ridge, taking its position on the left of, and on line 
with, the right company. The remaining companies 
would follow suit in succession, holding back until the 
ground beyond the ridge, on their right, had been gained. 

Failing this, each company would act as if it were 
the right company, except that platoons instead of com- 
panies would be used, the right platoon of each company 
pushing over the top of the ridge, and occupying beyond 



[29] 



36 (contd.) 

a position parallel to the front of the attack, the remain- 
ing platoons following suit and lining up on the left of 
the leading platoon. 

Example 2. A V-shaped fire-position, with the point 
toward the enemy, such as a low, semicircle ridge with 
the circumference towards the enemy. (Fig. 2.) The 
effect of such a feature of the ground is the same as in 
the preceding case, except that the difficulties are greatly 
increased. If the troops occupy such a position, they 






* / 






It 






ATTACKERS 

WHAT WE- 5K0ULD NOT D0- 






JL-'_t 



^""""<* 






'#f\ 



"'<s> . 

4:1 



£ 

?'•£ 



ATTACKERS 

"WHAT W£ 5H0ULD DO 



Fig. 2 

will be sure, upon leaving the position, to find themselves 
advancing in divergent direction. A case like this 
should, if possible, be treated in the same manner as the 
preceding example, the portion nearest the enemy being 
occupied first. 



[30] 



37-38 

Example 3. A bank along a road that runs diag- 
onally across the front of attack. Should be treated the 
same as Example 1. 

37. Pace of Advance. The advance from one fire- 
position to another is usually made by rushes, but when 
this method becomes impracticable, any method of ad- 
vance that brings the attacker closer to the enemy, such as 
crawling, should be employed. The length of the rushes 
depends on two things: 1st, the human element, which 
can only be ascertained by the unit commanders on the 
spot ; 2nd, the nature of the ground and the distance to 
the next firing-position. The most important details to 
be looked after are that the men rise together, dash for- 
ward without any straggling, and, upon halting, form a 
fairly straight and orderly firing line. If the enemy is 
on the lookout for rushes, and the chances are he will be, 
he will open fire, or increase his fire, just as soon as a unit 
rushes forward, or as soon as he sees that it is preparing 
to rush. It is, therefore, important that the adjoining 
unit or units should begin to deliver a covering fire just 
before the rush begins. Impress upon every man that 
the devil, in the form of a bullet, is likely to catch the 
men who fall behind. Promptness in rushing is greatly 
a matter of drill in time of peace, and, if properly in- 
stilled, will become a habit that will greatly assist the 
attack in war. 

38. Mixing of Units. If the attack is made over 
broken ground, with undulations and confusing ridges 
and mounds, it will be found that the advancing units 
will get pretty badly mixed up as we get nearer to the 
enemy's position, and consequently fire-control and lead- 

[31] 



39 

ership will become difficult. And, again, we must not 
make the mistake of closing our eyes to human nature 
in battle and imagine that every one is going to do just 
exactly what he is told to do, and do it at once. However, 
platoon commanders and squad leaders should do every- 
thing in their power to delay confusion as long as possi- 
ble, and then, when it does come, exert every effort to 
reduce it to a minimum. Impress upon the men the vital 
importance of obeying the commands of any platoon 
commander or squad leader in whose unit they may 
happen to find themselves in case of confusion. 

39. Importance of Pushing Forward. When- 
ever a company or platoon reaches covered ground and 
has halted to reform or take breath, it is of vital impor- 
tance, for two reasons, that a fire-position should be 
occupied to the front at the earliest possible moment. 
First, it is impossible to say when the enemy may decide 
to attack and himself suddenly occupy a fire-position in 
our immediate front — the one that we might have occu- 
pied ourselves — and thus bring the attack in that locality 
to a standstill; secondly, other units may be advancing 
over open ground on our right and left, and it will be of 
great assistance to them to find that a fire-position to 
their front has been occupied by us, — it will encourage 
them to pass forward. 

It can be laid down as a general rule in the attack 
that when any part of the line reaches cover, such as a 
wood, for instance, a part of the line should pass on and 
occupy a fire-position at the far end. However, care 
must be taken not to press so far to the front as to become 

[32] 



40-41 

completely isolated, and run the risk of being shot into 
by your own men, or cut off by the enemy. 

40. Use of Company Scouts. Cases constantly 
occur when platoon commanders and squad leaders must 
make rushes to the front without being able to see the 
ground which they will have to traverse, and, as a result, 
at the end of the rush they may find themselves in a very 
bad position. A case of this kind may occur when a fire- 
position is occupied just behind a crest from which the 
enemy's position can be seen, but when the ground imme- 
diately in front is covered by the top of the hill occupied 
by the attacker. It sometimes happens that the defense 
places an obstacle of some kind, under effective artillery 
and infantry fire, on the defenders' side of a ridge or hill, 
and which the attacker rushing over this ridge would not 
see until he was right upon it. A company scout sent on 
ahead would give warning of such an obstacle. It also 
sometimes happens that the unit rushes too far over a 
crest and occupies a fire-position that is exposed unneces- 
sarily. There is no doubt that in cases of this kind, it is 
well to send scouts forward to select the best positions, 
lie down in them, and wait until the line advances. 
Naturally enough, in open country and in cases where 
the advance of a scout would mask the fire of part of the 
company, this plan would be impracticable. 

41. Guarding the Flanks. Special attention is 
invited to the importance of the flank companies guard- 
ing their flanks, especially in closed country. Arrange- 
ments must be made to keep in communication with these 
flank guards, and also to see that they do not get too far 
ahead of the line. In a big fight our cavalry will be 

£33] 



42 

operating on our flanks, but they will probably be a con- 
siderable distance away, and the flanking companies 
must, therefore, provide for local protection. 

Supports. According to our Drill Regulations a 
company acting alone may have a support, but if acting 
as part of a battalion, it has no support of its own. One 
or more companies of the battalion form the support for 
the battalion. The movements of the support as a whole 
and the dispatch of reinforcements from it to the firing 
line are controlled by the major. If at any time during 
the advance a company commander sees that his com- 
pany has been so depleted that it can advance no farther, 
he should ask for support. 

42. Obstacles. We will now consider the obstacles 
that are likely to be met during this stage of the attack, 
and the best means of passing them. These obstacles 
may be divided into three general classes. 

1. Those in which the attacker is exposed to the 
enemy's view and fire when he is approaching the obsta- 
cle, while getting across it, and wh He \ emerging from it 
on the far side. 

A stream in the open is an example of this class, and 
to pass such an obstacle, which is exposed to the enemy's 
fire throughout, it is first necessary to obtain fire superi- 
ority, if only temporarily, which means that a heavy 
infantry firing line must be deployed in a good fire- 
position in rear of the obstacle. If possible, an artillery 
support should assist in subduing the hostile infantry 
fire. Of course, the fire-position should be so chosen that 
the field of fire will not be masked in part or in whole, 
by the men when approaching or crossing the obstacle, 

[34] 



42 (contd.) 
or when deploying beyond. If it be not possible to 
select such a fire-position, the situation becomes most 
difficult, and a second tier of fire will have to be formed 
in rear of that immediately behind the obstacle, and, if 
possible, machine guns should be used extensively to 
assist in gaining and maintaining superiority of fire. 
The best formation to be used while actually crossing, 
depends upon the nature of the obstacle. In case of a 
shallow stream, for instance, which is easily fordable at 
all points, the squads or platoons could be sent across in 
line of skirmishers. On the other hand, if the passage 
were limited to a bridge across the stream, the command 
should be rushed across by successive squads or platoons, 
in column of files, or in column of twos, with increased 
intervals and distances between the men. 

It is most important that a firing line be established 
on the far side of the obstacle at the earliest moment 
possible. Consequently, the leading squad or platoon 
should deploy immediately upon clearing the obstacle, 
and occupy a firing position well to the front. If it be 
not practicable to occupy a position well to the front at 
once, then a second advance should be made as soon as 
possible so as to reduce the distance the succeeding 
squads or platoons will have to run with their flanks to 
the enemy. The leading squad or platoon should be 
careful not to spread out more than is necessary; for, 
the more it spreads out the greater distance will the suc- 
ceeding units have to run before getting on the line, to 
the right and left of the preceding squads. It must be 
distinctly understood beforehand which units are to go 
to the right and which to the left. If the crossing is 

[35] 



42 (contd.) 

being made by squads, the company commander may, 
for instance, direct that the second squad go to the right 
of the leading squad, the third squad to the left, the 
fourth squad to the right, the fifth to the left, etc. And 
again, the ground just beyond the obstacle might be such 
that it would be better for the first squad across to incline 
to the right (or left) upon reaching the far end of the 
obstacle, and the remaining squads form on its left (or 
right ) . 

Of course, the thing to do in every case is to pass 
around the obstacle, if possible. This may often be done 
in case of small obstacles (those taking up only forty or 
fifty yards of front ) , but as a rule it is not possible to 
avoid the large ones. 

2. The second class of obstacles is those in which 
the attacker is protected from the enemy' 's view and fire 
while approaching the obstacle, but is partly exposed to 
fire when passing through it, and may be subjected to 
heavy fire when emerging from the obstacle. 

A stream with trees and bushes, or a thin wood along 
its banks might be an example of this class of obstacles. 
The far edge of either of these makes an excellent mark 
for the enemy's artillery as well as for his infantry. 

It is a great mistake for a company to blunder into 
an obstacle without having had a reconnaissance made. 
The first thing to do then, is to send out a reconnoitering 
patrol in charge of an officer or noncommissioned officer, 
to ascertain whether the obstacle, or the ground just 
beyond, is occupied by the enemy; also, to get informa- 
tion regarding the best way through or over the obstacle, 
and whether there is a good position in which the line 

[36] 



42 (contd.) 
can deploy and form preparatory to continuing the 
attack. Great care must be taken to see that the com- 
pany does not come under a heavy fire near the far edge 
in unsuitable formation, and we must also see that the 
company is not exposed unnecessarily to the enemy's fire 
before everything is ready for an immediate advance. 

3. Those obstacles in which the attacker is protected 
from the enemy's view and fire in approaching and cross- 
ing the obstacle, but may be subjected to a heavy fire 
when emerging from it. 

A thick wood is an example of an obstacle of this 
class. The following points should be borne in mind : — 

Be careful not to lose your direction; connect with 
the companies on your right and left, and maintain the 
general alignment. 

Take every possible precaution to prevent the enemy 
from learning that you have reached the obstacle, and 
especially that you are about to emerge on the far side. 
If he knows this, he will more than probably be waiting 
for you and will greet you with a heavy, well-directed 
fire just as soon as you appear on his side of the obstacle. 

Do not mistake any of your own troops for the 
enemy. 

Before reaching the far side of the obstacle ascertain 
by means of scouts or patrols whether it will be exposed 
to fire; also, if possible, locate a fire-position 50 or 100 
yards beyond the obstacle. 

Arrange to rush out of the obstacle with as much of 
the company as can be conveniently handled at one time. 
Do not emerge in driblets, and don't make the common 
mistake of forming a firing line along the edge of the 

[37] 



43 

wood, thus occupying a well-defined line that stands out 
as an excellent mark for the enemy's fire. . 

Cornfields. It is thought the best way of crossing 
a cornfield, is by a series of rushes in squad columns, or 
some other column of files. A line of skirmishers in *a 
field of high corn is difficult to control; and, further- 
more, such a formation is conducive to skulking, men on 
the ground failing to rise and advance at the command 
and remaining undiscovered. .., 

Marshes. If impossible to go around wet, marshy 
ground, there is but one thing to do. Go right through 
it, lying down in the mud and water when ordered, and 
rising and advancing when the command is given. The 
formations to be adopted in crossing a marsh would be 
determined by the same general principles that apply 
in getting over level dry ground, with such modifications 
as might be made necessary by deep pools, difficult mud 
holes, etc. The main point to impress upon the men is 
that they must not be afraid of mud and water — they 
are much, less dangerous than bullets. 

43. End of Stage. The culminating point of this 
stage of the attack is the establishment of a fire-position 
close enough to the enemy to enable us to gain superi- 
ority of fire, and by "superiority of fire" we mean that 
our fire must be so accurate, heavy, and deadly that most 
of the enemy will be keening their heads under cover, 
and, consequently we will be able to advance rierht up to 
them without a good part of the company getting put 
out of business. 



[38] 



43 (contd.) 
How near must this fire- position be to the enemy? 
The distance of this fire-position from the enemy 
will depend upon the effectiveness of the enemy's fire 
and nature of the ground in front of his position, which 
will determine the cover afforded the attack, the avail- 
ability of fire -positions and the field of view afforded 
the enemy. Of course, we will want to get as close as 
possible to the enemy before beginning the final struggle 
for fire-superiority — the closer the better. If the ground 
to the front of the enemy is open, his fire and field of fire 
are good, and the attackers' fire-positions are poor, it will 
probably be impossible to get any nearer than 800 yards 
or more without first gaining superiority of fire. On the 
other hand, if the ground in front of the enemy is broken, 
and affords cover and fire-positions to the attacker, it 
may be possible to get as near as one or two hundred 
yards before beginning the final struggle for fire superi- 
ority. Remember, we must husband our energy and our 
ammunition for this struggle for fire superiority. 



•)\ 



44-45 



Chapter IV 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

The Third Stage of the Attack 

THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPERIORITY OF FIRE OVER THE 

ENEMY 

44. Situation. We have now reached a fire-posi- 
tion, say, within five or six hundred yards of the enemy, 
beyond which it is impossible to advance without reduc- 
ing the hostile fire. In other words, our advance has been 
stopped. This stage of the attack is, necessarily, a sta- 
tionary operation. 

45. Object of this Stage of the Attack. The ob- 
ject of this stage of the attack is to gain superiority of 
fire so that we can advance to a position so near to the 
enemy that we will be able to charge him, and every effort 
must be made to gain superiority of fire as soon as pos- 
sible; for, if it is not gained within a reasonable time, 
the energies of the firing line will become exhausted and 
the attack die out — hence, the vital importance of bring- 
ing this stage of the attack to a head as early as possible. 

How near should this position be? It should be as 
near as possible — not over 800 yards — for, the .shorter 
the distance the shorter will be the time that the attacker 
will be subjected to fire, and the less exhausted will he 
be upon reaching the defender's position, and, conse- 
quently, the better able will he be to cope with the enemy 
in the bayonet combat that is likely to take place. While 

[40] 



46 
this fire-position should be as near the enemy as pos- 
sible, the company commander should not make the mis- 
take, in case of open ground, of pushing too close to 
the hostile position without first gaining superiority of 
fire. If he does, he will probably find himself at the 
mercy of the enemy, who will have better cover, and 
will also, because of the open nature of the country, be 
able to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. On the 
other hand, if the fire-position is established too far back, 
the chances are that neither side will gain superiority of 
fire. The following principles should guide the com- 
pany commander: 

1st. If the cover is good both for the firing line and 
the reenf orcements, advance as far as you can, whether 
or not you have gained superiority of fire. 

2nd. Whether the ground is broken or very open, 
the fire-position must in every case be near enough to 
insure a decision as regards superiority of fire. 

3rd. The location of the fire-position must be such 
that it will be possible to send up reenf orcements with- 
out exposing them to fire too long on open ground. 

46. How to accomplish our Object. In order to 
accomplish our object it will be necessary for every one 
to put his shoulder to the wheel with the determination 
"to do or die." Remember, that this is really the crucial 
stage of the fight — it is the test that is going to decide 
whether we are going to advance, and drive the enemy 
out of his position, or whether he is going to stop us, 
and, if so, probably drive us back. Our salvation, our 
success, depends upon effective fire — a heavy, deadly 
fire — in order to produce which : 

[41] 



47 

1st. The soldier must shoot accurately; 

2nd. The fire must be well directed by the company 
commander, and properly controlled by the platoon com- 
manders and squad leaders ; 

3rd. There must be cooperation, teamwork, between 
the different companies of the firing line and between 
the different platoons and the different squads of the 
same company. 

This stage of the attack should bring home to every 
man the importance of being able to shoot well, and 
doing his level best in time of peace to become a fair 
shot, if not a good one; a good one, if not an excellent 
one. The knowledge of being able to hit what you shoot 
at gives you confidence in yourself. If you know that 
the men on your right and left can shoot well, it will give 
you confidence in your company, and when the hour of 
action comes you will find this confidence to be a wonder- 
ful bracer — a great tonic — a big courage producer. This 
is also the stage of the fight that brings home to us the 
great importance and value of proper training in field 
firing. 

47. Reenforcements. When the battalion com- 
mander sees that the firing line has been halted and can 
advance no further without superiority of fire, he will, 
of course, send up reenforcements. The Drill Regula- 
tions prescribe that reenforcements shall take their 
places on the flanks, so as not to mix up the units, but 
experience has shown that in practice the men inter- 
mingle very much with those already on the firing line, 
and, as a result, there is considerable confusion. The 
men must be taught that they must at once place them- 

[42] 



48-49 
selves under the orders of the corporals whose squads 
they happen to join. There will always be lots for the 
arriving spare officers and noncommissioned officers to do 
in the way of assisting in the fire-control,, encouraging 
the men, etc. When the company commander sees the 
reinforcements approaching he should start a vigorous 
covering fire. 

48. Artillery. Of course, during, the struggle for 
superiority of fire, the company will probably be ex- 
posed to the enemy's artillery fire. However, our artil- 
lery will make every endeavor to help us gain superiority 
Off fire, and, as we have seen (Par. 28), it has certain 
advantages over the hostile artillery. 

49. Counter-Attack. During this stage of the 
attack we must be on the lookout for a counter-attack 
by the defense. Generally a counter-attack is delivered 
by the reserve of the defense, on one of the flanks of the 
attack, but it may be made on the front of the attacking 
line. However, whether made on our flank or front, a 
counter-attack should be met with vigor — we should 
move right out and go after the attackers, and not make 
the mistake of remaining in our fire-position while they 
attack us, thus ourselves assuming a defensive attitude. 

How will we know when we have gained superiority 
of fire and can resume the advance? Upon occupying 
the fire-position beyond which we can not go without 
gaining superiority of fire, something like the following 
will probably occur: Both sides will open up with a 
general f usilade, which will gradually subside ; the burst 
of fire from one side is answered by a burst of about 
the same volume from the other, and this continues for 



[43] 



49 (contd.) 

some time, until we find that when one side opens fire, 
the other answers with a heavier fire that reduces or 
actually silences the opponent's fire. This is the first 
sign that superiority of fire is being gained. For a time 
this superiority of fire may be gained by one side and 
then by the other, and as time goes on we find that one 
side gains superiority of fire of tener than the other. Let 
us suppose that the attack is in the ascendent. Finally 
we find that as soon as the enemy opens fire there is a 
terrific burst of fire from the attack, and the fire of the 
defense at once slackens or ceases altogether. We then 
know that we are approaching the end of this stage, and 
we must, therefore, begin to make preparations to ad- 
vance to the position from which we are going to charge. 



[44] 



50-51-52-53 

Chapter V 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

The Fourth Stage of the Attack 

THE ADVANCE AFTER SUPERIORITY OF FIRE HAS BEEN 
GAINED TO A POSITION CLOSE ENOUGH TO CHARGE 

50. Situation. We have gained superiority of fire 
and are now ready to advance to a position close enough 
to the enemy to assault. 

51. The Object of this Stage of the Attack. As 
just stated, the object of this stage of the attack is to 
advance to a position close enough to the enemy to 
assault. The distance of this position from the enemy 
will, as previously explained, depend upon various con- 
ditions. "It may be from 25 to 400 yards." (Par. 465, 
Infantry Drill Regulations. ) 

52. How to accomplish our Object. In order to 
accomplish our object we must maintain our superiority 
of fire, and cover the rest of the ground with the least 
possible delay. Impress upon everyone — officers, non- 
commissioned officers, and privates — the vital importance 
of moving forward as soon as fire superiority has been 
gained, and of covering the ground with the least delay 
practicable. Delay will only result in increased casualties, 
and success now no longer depends entirely on fire effect, 
but it depends on the assault, which must be delivered 
as soon as possible. 

53. Who gives the Order to Advance? It is not 
necessary to wait for an order from the battalion com- 

[45] 



54 

mander to advance. As soon as any company commander 
sees that he has gained fire superiority he should at once 
commence the forward movement on his own responsi- 
bility. An advance started even by a squad has often 
set an example that was at once followed by other parts 
of the firing line, and that resulted in the prompt build- 
ing up of a fire position considerably nearer the enemy's 
position. Cases might arise when it would be better for 
the original firing line not to advance from this position, 
but, instead, to have the support come from the rear, pass 
through the line arid take up the advance from that point, 
under the covering fire of the firing line. Where the 
firing line could fire over the heads of the support, would 
be a case where this might be done. 

54. Covering Fire. Even though there may be no 
doubt about our having gained superiority of fire, we 
must not attempt to continue the advance without cover- 
ing fire. There are two types of covering fire: (1) 
when the fire is delivered by troops in rear over the heads 
of those advancing, and (2) when the fire is delivered 
by units to cover the advance of other units to their right 
and left. The covering fire delivered by a unit that has 
already advanced, to support the advance of another 
unit in rear, is, of course, only a modification of the 
second type mentioned. 

The overhead fire delivered by troops in rear is by far 
the best kind of covering fire, because it can be furnished 
by support or reserve companies, and this leaves the 
firing line free to move forward, further assisted by the 
second type of covering fire which it can provide for 
itself. Of course, the first type of covering fire can be 

[46] 



54 (contd.) 
used only when it is safe to shoot over the heads of the 
troops in front. If it is possible to fire over the heads 
of advancing squads and platoons, we might do one of 
three things : 

1st, Have the original firing line remain in its posi- 
tion and furnish a covering fire for the support, which is 
sent forward through the firing line to assault. 

Advantages. The men of the support being 
fresher, will doubtless possess more energy, especially 
for the assault, which is to follow soon, and when passing 
through the original firing line, they may take a part of 
it with them, thus increasing the strength of the assault. 
Again, the original firing line would probably be able to 
furnish a more efficient covering fire than the troops in 
rear, because they know the range and are familiar with 
the points to aim at. 

Disadvantage. The possible disadvantage is 
that the original firing line might be short of ammuni- 
tion, and ammunition would be required for covering fire 
more than for the assaulting line. However, this dis- 
advantage could be overcome by having the support 
drop part of its ammunition as it passes through. 

2nd. Have the original firing line advance under 
cover of the support in rear. 

Disadvantage. The original firing line might 
not have enough energy left to carry out the assault. 

3rd. Reenforce the firing line as heavily as possible, 
and then have it advance under its own covering fire. 
In case any part of the advancing line is checked, then 
the company commander must open a rapid fire with the 
rest of the company and thus at once restore superiority 

[47] 



55-56-57 

of fire, and immediately rush the greater part of the com- 
pany to the front. 

55. Formation. By this stage of the fight the fir- 
ing line will have been well reenforced, so that the men 
will probably be as close together as is compatible with 
the proper use of their rifles. The advances must be 
made by rushes by squads and platoons. The length 
of the rushes will depend on the nature of the ground, 
but, remember, you must get over the remaining ground 
as rapidly as possible — we must get up to the assault- 
ing point at the earliest moment possible. 

56. Artillery. Our artillery will be assisting us 
with rapid bursts of fire, of which we should take full 
advantage to advance. 

57. Obstacles. Any natural obstacles that may be 
encountered during this stage of the attack will be passed 
as explained in the second stage of the attack. They will 
present very little more difficulty, if any, for, although 
we are now much nearer the enemy, we must remember 
that we have gained superiority of fire. The artificial 
obstacles that we may encounter are the ones that will 
give us trouble, because the enemy places them where 
we are apt to come upon them unexpectedly. As a rule, 
however, such obstacles will not be very extensive; for, 
it takes time and material to make them, and extensive 
obstacles in front of a defensive position render a counter- 
attack very difficult, if not impossible. The same general 
principles that apply to the passage of natural obstacles 
are applicable to the crossing of artificial ones. 



[48] 



58-59-60-61 

Chapter VI 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

The Fifth Stage of the Attack 

THE CHARGE 

i 

58. Situation. We have at last reached a position 
which is near enough for us to charge the enemy. 

59. The Object of this Stage of the Attack. The 
object of this stage of the attack is to close in on the 
enemy with fixed bayonets and drive him from his posi- 
tion in confusion and disorder. 

60. How to accomplish our Object. The charg- 
ing line must be properly built up before the beginning 
of the charge, which must be delivered with the utmost 
vigor, and without any restraint whatsoever on the 
ardor of the charging troops by an attempt to maintain 
alignment. The charge should be made simultaneously 
by all the units participating. Confidence in their 
ability to use the bayonet in combat is a great stimulus 
to assaulting troops. Impress upon your men the im- 
portance of becoming proficient in time of peace in the 
use of the bayonet. The charge is usually immediately 
preceded by clip fire. 

61. When to fix Bayonets. The major or senior 
officer in the firing line determines when bayonets shall 
be fixed, and gives the proper command or signal. It 
is repeated by all parts of the firing line. Bayonets must 
be fixed at once, but in such a way that there will be no 
marked pause in the firing. A good plan is to have the 

[49] 



62 

even numbers fix bayonets first and then the odd num- 
bers, the odd numbers increasing their rate of fire while 
the even numbers are fixing bayonets, and the even num- 
bers increasing their rate of fire while the odd numbers 
are fixing their bayonets. The support also fixes bayo- 
nets. Bayonets will be fixed generally before or during 
the last, or second last, advance preceding the charge. 

62. When to Charge. Upon reaching the posi- 
tion from which the assault will be made, build up the line 
as rapidly as possible with the units arriving from the 
last fire position, and before charging be sure to see that 
enough troops are on hand to make it a success. How- 
ever do not have too dense a mass ; for, then the men 
will be in one another's way. Also, see whether the 
adjoining companies have yet built up their lines and 
are ready to charge. Reserves joining the firing line 
now will give the charge a strong impetus. It is impos- 
sible to give any fixed rule as to just when the charge 
should be started. "The psychological moment of the 
charge cannot be determined far in advance. The tacti- 
cal instinct of the responsible officer must decide." (Par, 
464, Infantry Drill Regulations.) "The commander of 
the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give 
the order before the charge is made. Subordinate com- 
manders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops 
are ready to charge signal that fact to the commander." 
(Par. 466, Infantry Drill Regulations.) However, 
history shows cases where a corporal or a drummer boy 
sprang forward at the "psychological moment" and was 
followed by the rest of the firing line in a charge that 
completely routed the enemy. "Subject to orders from 

[50] 



63-64 
higher authority, the major determines the point from 
which the charge is to be made. The firing line having 
arrived at that point and being in readiness, the major 
causes the charge to be sounded. The signal is repeated 
by the musicians of all parts of the line. The company 
officers lead the charge. The skirmishers spring for- 
ward shouting, run with bayonets at charge, and close 
with the enemy." (Par. 319, Infantry Drill Regula- 
tions. ) • 

A charge to be successful must above all things have 
cohesion— the men must start together, keep together, 
and fight together — they must charge with vigor and 
determination. The charge must be started promptly, 
when ordered whether the men are one or one thousand 
yards from the enemy — the distance has nothing to do 
with it so far as the men are concerned. 

63. Conduct after the Charge. The further con- 
duct of the charging troops will depend upon circum- 
stances; they may halt and engage in bayonet combat, 
or in pursuing fire; they may advance a short distance 
to obtain a field of fire or to drive the enemy from the 
vicinity; they may assemble or reorganize, etc. If the 
enemy vacates his position every effort should be made 
to open fire at once on the retreating mass, reorganiza- 
tion of the attacking troops being of secondary impor- 
tance to the infliction of further losses upon the enemy 
and to the increase of his confusion. (Par. 31 9, Infantry 
Drill Regulations.) 

64. Our Artillery. Our Artillery will be on the 
lookout for the charge, and, about this time, will increase 
their range so as to burst their shells just beyond the 

[SI] 



65-66 

enemy's position, so as to check the possible arrival of 
hostile supports or reserves. A premature charge by a 
part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other 
parts of the line should join at once, if there is any 
prospect of success. Under exceptional circumstances 
a part of the line may be compelled to charge without 
authority from the rear. The intention to do so should be 
signalled to the rear. (Par. 470, Infantry Drill Regu- 
lations. ) 

65. Supports and Reserves. At the signal for 
the charge the near-by supports and reserves rush for- 
ward. (Par. 466, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 

66. Gounter-Attack. We must not forget that 
even at this stage of the fight the enemy may have enough 
energy left to leave his position and attack us. How- 
ever, such an attack must be met with vigor — we should 
go right after the enemy at once. To assume a defensive 
attitude at this stage of the attack would be suicidal. 
"If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is 
intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make 
every effort to stop the rearward movement, and will 
reestablish the firing line in a covered position as close 
as possible to the enemy." (Par. 474, Infantry Drill 
Regulations.) "If the attack must be abandoned, the 
rearward movement should continue with promptness 
until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facili- 
tates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The 
point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent 
interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to 
resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should 



[52] 



67 
be covered by the artillery and by the reserves, if any are 
available." (Par. 475, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 

67. Conclusion. It must not, of course, be sup- 
posed every attack, or even the majority of them, will 
have five separate stages? and will be conducted just as 
we have conducted this one ; for, such will not be the case. 
Every attack has its own individual characteristics and 
must be handled according to the nature of the ground, 
and the tactical and other conditions involved. How- 
ever, the stereotyped form of attack through which we 
have just taken you gives a very good, general idea of 
what an attack is like, and the general basic principles 
presented are applicable to any attack. 



[53] 



68-69 

Chapter VII 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

The Counter- Attack 

68. Classes of Counter- Attacks. There are two 
general classes of counter-attacks — what may be called 
the "general counter-attack," and the "local counter- 
attack." The general counter-attack is usually made by 
launching the reserve against one of the enemy's flanks 
when his attack is in full progress ; by making- a frontal 
attack with the firing line and supports after repulsing 
the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing 
fire ; or, by the troops in rear of the firing line, when the 
enemy has reached the defensive position, and is in dis- 
order. However, as the general counter-attacks are 
made by large bodies of troops, under a higher com- 
mander and involve higher tactics, their principles do 
not directly concern company commanders, and, there- 
fore, will not be discussed here. 

69. Local Counter- Attacks. The local counter- 
attack is the one in which the company is directly inter- 
ested. Such an attack might be made to drive the enemy 
from an important position lie has gained in our immedi- 
ate front and from which he is doing us considerable 
damage, or to halt his advance during the third or fourth 
stage of the attack, or it might be made to block the 
enemy's charge. For instance, let us suppose the enemy 
has gained superiority of fire and is moving up to a posi- 
tion from which to assault. What are we going to do? 

[54] 



70 

Are we going to turn tail and run, await the assault in 
our trenches, or shall we go out of our trenches and 
assault the attackers? Is it better to sit in our own 
trenches and wait until the hostile troops come pouring 
over the parapet, shouting and yelling and digging their 
bayonets into us, or is it better to rush forward over the 
parapet ourselves, do the shouting and yelling ourselves, 
and do a little bayonet digging on our own hook? 

70. When to deliver the Counter- Attack. There 
would be no object in delivering a local counter-attack 
during the first two stages of the attack. It is only when 
the attack has been stopped temporarily by the fire of 
the defense and must gain superiority of fire before it can 
advance further, that the necessity for delivering a local 
counter-attack would arise. Naturally enough, some 
parts of the defenders position will be stronger than 
others ; in the strong parts, where the defense has a good 
field of fire, the attack will be at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for superiority of fire and may never gain it 
sufficiently to assemble for the assault. This is not the 
part of the defender's position where the counter-attack 
is likely to be needed — it is likely to be needed in one of 
the weak parts of the defender's position, where, almost 
invariably owing to cover, the attacker will be able to 
get much closer. If the attacking line is allowed to 
remain in its fire-position and obtain superiority of fire, 
there is every chance that this part of the defender's line 
will be defeated. There are two ways of preventing 
this: One is for the defenders, while the struggle for 
superiority of fire is in the balance, to gain temporary 
superiority of fire and then attack the enemy, advancing 

[55] 



70 (contd.) 

in a thick line, covering the ground with as few halts as 
possible and charging the enemy with the bayonet. The 
other alternative, but a far more risky one for the safety 
of the position, is to wait until the attack has gained 
superiority of fire and is assembling for the assault. This 
form of counter-attack would be resorted to only when 
previous efforts as suggested above have failed. In this 
case the company would charge with bayonet straight 
over the trenches. 

In those parts of the defender's line where the main 
defense will depend upon the success of local counter- 
attacks, each company should be assigned an objective 
before the counter-attack is commenced. Also, a good 
fire-position in front of the general line of defense should 
be selected before hand, and even improved, so that when 
the blow has been delivered the companies will not find 
themselves lying out in a very exposed position where it 
is impossible for them to use their rifles with effect. 
Local counter-attacks have often failed to produce any 
permanent effect, either because they have gone too far, 
or because they have reached a position where they were 
unduly exposed to the enemy's fire ; the enemy has then 
attacked and driven back the counter-attack, and practi- 
cally followed it into the main position. 

When deciding upon the objective of a counter- 
attack, so far as it can be done by studying the ground in 
front of the position, a company commander should bear 
in mind — 

(1) The position which the enemy may reach 
before being brought to a standstill by the fire of the 



[56] 



70 (contd.) 
defense, and beyond which he cannot advance without 
first obtaining superiority of fire. 

(2) The line, perhaps in dead ground, where the 
attack, if it gains superiority of fire, is likely to assemble 
preparatory to the assault. 

(3) A suitable fire-position, always in advance of 
the last mentioned line, which the counter-attack can 
reach, and which can be supported later by fire from the 
main position, if possible. 

By not aiming at too much it is probable that the 
blow will be more permanently effective, it will be much 
easier to deliver, the losses will be greatly reduced, and 
if superiority of fire is obtained at once over the enemy in 
front, often his leading troops will be driven back by the 
counter-attack. A further advance with a view to 
defeating the enemy and driving him back from this 
part of the battlefield can be easily initiated. 

The most important point to remember is that when 
everything else has failed, and the enemy, having gained 
superiority of fire, is assembling close in front of the 
trench for the final assault, he must be charged before 
he has time to charge himself. Furthermore, if one com- 
pany commander sees another company on his right or 
left issuing from their trenches to charge, he must do the 
same with his company, whatever the situation in his im- 
mediate front may be. The only exception will be when 
the attackers in front of his company have not been able 
to gain superiority of fire, in which case the company 
would remain in its trenches and turn its fire upon the 
enemy in front of the companies delivering the counter- 
attack. 

[57] 



71-72 

Chapter VIII 

THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

Meeting Engageiment, in which the Company is 

Exposed to Both Artillery and Infantry Fire 

from the Beginning 

71. Meeting Engagement. "Meeting engagement" 
is the name given to an action when the opposing forces 
meet and commence to fight before either side has had 
time to make much preparation for the attack or defense. 
Such an engagement is characterized by the necessity for 
hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of 
reconnaissance; by the necessity of rapid deployment, 
often under fire ; and usually the absence of trenches or 
other artificial cover. It is, therefore, evident that the 
first and second stages of the attack described in the 
previous chapters either disappear entirely or are greatly 
curtailed. 

72. Battlefield. The first thing to realize is that, as 
a rule, the ground has not been selected by either side as 
being especially suitable for either attack or defense, 
and, owing to the lack of time, it will contain few, if any, 
artificial obstacles ; also, the entrenching, if any, will be 
hasty and limited. However, as a rule, there will be 
several important tactical features, such as streams, 
ridges, woods, hills, etc., the possession of one or more of 
which in particular will be an advantage to the side that 
holds it. The feature may not be very marked of itself, 

[58] 



73-74 
but it will be very important as compared with the rest 
of the features of the ground. Such a position will 
generally assist either the attack or defense. The thing 
to do, of course, is, if possible, to get possession of the 
feature without delay. 

73. Necessity to Attack. We see from the above 
that the conditions of a meeting engagement give the 
attack advantages in addition to those mentioned in pre- 
vious chapters, and, also, that the conditions of such an 
engagement make it necessary to assume the offensive 
at once and attack with energy, vigor, and determination, 
so as to gain ground to the front and throw the enemy 
on the defensive at all costs. Everything must, there- 
fore, be done to gain superiority of fire just as soon as 
possible. Hence the importance of deploying and main- 
taining a strong firing line from the first. 

74. Final Stages. Having gained superiority of 
fire in the initial stage of the encounter, the final stages, 
including the maintenance of fire superiority, the ad- 
vance to within charging distance, and the charge, would 
be carried out in a manner similar to that described in 
the stereotyped form of attack, except that, the ground 
not having been especially selected for defensive action 
and being free of artificial obstacles, the last stages of 
the attack would not be so difficult. 



[59] 



75-76-77 



Chapter IX 
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK 

Advance Guard-Action 

75. Observation of Country While Marching. 

When the company is acting as an advance guard, as the 
troops are advancing through the country the captain 
must be constantly examining the ground in his vicinity, 
and planning in his own mind what he would do in case 
the enemy should be suddenly met in that particular 
neighborhood. All other officers, as well as the noncom- 
missioned officers, must also constantly observe the coun- 
try as the column advances. 

76. Action Preceding Meeting Engagements. A 
meeting engagement is usually preceded by an action 
between the ojDposing advance guards, or between the 
opposing advance guard of one side and the outpost of 
the other. An advance guard moving in the direction 
of the enemy may meet a hostile advance guard of a body 
of troops sent forward to meet it, or it may meet an out- 
post line covering the enemy's main body. In either 
case the advance guard should attack and defeat the 
enemy's advance detachments before they can be reen- 
forced from the rear. 

77. Company Forming Part of Advance Guard 

Support 

Meeting Hostile Advance Guard. Let us suppose 
the company forms a part of the support of the advance 

[60] 



77 (contd.) 
guard. It will generally meet a detachment of the enemy 
that is hardly stronger than itself, and which should in 
every case be attacked immediately, with all possible 
vigor. Not far in rear of this hostile detachment we 
know more troops are following, and we must hit a good, 
strong blow before any of those troops can come up from 
the rear. The fact that the ground may be poor for 
attack, but good for defense, must not tempt us to 
assume a defensive attitude. Start right out after the 
enemy and strike him hard before he has time to realize 
what is happening. The question of committing the 
advance guard to a serious engagement without instruc- 
tions from the commander of the main body, need not 
worry the commander of the support. We know we 
have in our immediate front an enemy that cannot be 
very strong for the moment, and if we can defeat him 
and drive him back on the rest of his advance guard, and 
perhans even on the main body, the troons in his rear 
may be thrown on the defensive — such is the tremendous 
moral power of attack and initial success. Even if our 
attack on the support is brought to a standstill, we will 
have at least thrown the enemy on the defensive, and 
also will have more than likely caused him to greatly 
exaggerate our strength. 

If both sides should assume the offensive, the one 
that develons the most effective fire first and makes the 
best use of the ground will throw the other side on the 
defensive. We, therefore, see the vital importance of 
gaining superiority of fire as soon as possible and losing 
no time in gaining a position close enough to assault. 



[61] 



77 (contd.) 

Protection of Flanks. The importance of protecting 
our flanks in advance guard action cannot be over esti- 
mated, and we should practice it diligently during times 
of peace. - 

Meeting Hostile Outpost. If the company encoun- 
ters a hostile outpost, we will find the enemy already 
occupying a defensive position. In view of the fact that 
his reinforcements would not be actually marching up 
in his rear, as in the case of an advance guard, a little 
more time would elapse before they could come up ; also, 
his position would be well chosen and undoubtedly his 
supports will have occupied the best positions in the 
vicinity. Therefore, the enemy having already assumed 
the defensive, the speed and immediate application of all 
the force available to throw him .on the defense would 
not be required. Our object would be to push forward, 
establish a fire-position in the best place available, and 
endeavor to gain suneriority of fire over the defense. 
As a rule, this should not be very difficult, because we 
would probably be stronger than the outuost in our im- 
mediate front, and bv such action we would disclose the 
enemy's position and to some extent his strenq-th, and 
thus assist materiallv the operations of the rest of the 
advance guard when it comes up to the firing line. On 
the other hand, should the company when it meets the 
hostile outpost, content itself with merely holding its 
ground and adopting a purely defensive attitude until 
the arrival of the rest of the advance guard, the enemy 
would probablv be encouraoed and we wo^ld not be able 
to gret much, if anv, information about him. In fact, it 
might not be at all clear what was in front of the advance 

[62] 



78 
guard, which, perhaps, was being held back by only a 
few dismounted men. It may be remarked here that it 
is a general rule always to make an effort to develop the 
strength and position of the enemy before planning your 
main attack, so that you may know what you are up 
against, and in order to accomplish this purpose it is 
sometimes necessary to send out combat patrols to draw 
the enemy's fire. 

78. Company Forming Part of the Advance 
Guard Reserve 

Meeting Hostile Advance Guard. Let us now sup- 
pose that the company forms a part of the reserve instead 
of the support of the advance guard. While a vigorous 
offensive is of the greatest value at all times, it is never 
more so than when in action against a hostile advance 
guard. As we form a part of the reserve, the plan of 
attack, of course, will have been decided upon before we 
come into action, and our main object will be to reach 
a fire-position close enough to gain superiority of fire 
with the least possible delay. It should be borne in mind 
that the enemy may be reenf orced at any time by troops 
in his rear, so that we must take advantage of every con- 
dition to push forward within assaulting distance. 

"Protection of Flanks. We have already mentioned 
the importance of flank protection in advance guard 
action. If the company happens to be on the flank, two 
or three squads should be placed on the outer flank to 
protect the company, especially from mounted troops. 
This flank guard under certain conditions could be used 
to provide covering fire for the company. Scouts should 
be sent out beyond the flank. 

[63] 



79 

79. Company as Support to Artillery. When 
artillery forms part of the advance guard it is sometimes 
necessary to detach a company to protect the guns. In 
such case, you should first ascertain the direction from 
which the enemy would be most likely to attack the 
artillery and then make your arrangements to meet the 
attack. Of course, the enemy could not attack over the 
ground that is being used by the advance guard ; conse- 
quently, the possible directions are from the two flanks 
and the rear. Should the general situation, or the nature 
of the terrain make an attack from one or more of these 
directions impossible, it would, naturally enough, sim- 
plify the task of the infantry escort. 

If an attack were expected from one flank only, our 
main object would be to prevent the enemy from occu- 
pying any locality from which they could fire upon the 
flanks of the guns or against the wagons in rear. It is 
generally impossible for the company to occupy all such 
localities. However, if there is a position that commands 
the others, it should be occupied by the company, pro- 
vided the enemy cannot get between the company and 
the artillery without being exposed to the fire of the 
former. The company commander should send out 
scouts or patrols to all dead ground in the vicinity to 
give warning of a hostile advance. The company must 
not occupy a position too close to the artillery, because 
it might interfere with the working of the guns, and it 
would also probably suffer casualties from any hostile 
artillery fire that might be directed against our guns. 

The company commander should arrange with the 
artillery commander to be informed at the earliest possi- 

[64] 



79 (contd.) 
ble moment of any change in the position of the guns, 
because the infantry marches much slower than the artil- 
lery, and is apt to be left behind, especially when scouts 
or detachments must be called in. The company com- 
mander, in case the company is to follow .the artillery 
to a new position, should always ascertain from the artil- 
lery commander the exact location of the position, and, 
if possible, the best road leading thereto. 

When the enemy may attack from either flank or 
from the rear, arrangements similar to those already 
described to deal with each eventuality, must be made. 
In a case like this it would be best to keep the greater 
part of the company together in the most important posi- 
tion, from which, perhaps, two or three possible lines of 
approach could be commanded. Should the enemy suc- 
ceed in occupying a position from which their rifle fire 
would interfere with the service of our guns, the com- 
pany must promptly attack the hostile position and carry 
it by assault. 



[65] 



80-81 



Chapter X 
THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE 

General Rules and Principles 

80. Necessity for defensive Action. As we have 
previously shown, the attack is the dominating spirit of 
war — it is the only spirit that wins battles. However, 
there are times when the defense is necessary — indeed, ] 
when there could be no successful attack without a pre- 
ceding or simultaneous defense. 

81. Classes of Defense. There may be said to be 
two general classes of defense: 1st, the so-called passive 
defense, when a certain position is to be held only for a 
short time because of the vastly superior strength of the 
enemy — for example, the action of a rear guard that is 
merely delaying the enemy so that the main body can get 
away, or the action of an outpost that is driven in by the 
enemy. 

2nd, the so-called active defense, in which the spirit 
of attack dominates, and which is only resorted to as a 
stepping stone, as a means to the attack. In other words, 
we start out with the intention, the determination, of 
attacking the enemy, but we first delay his advance, make 
his attacking us as difficult as possible, cause him to lose 
more men than we do, break down as much as we can 
his power of attack, and flnallv attack him ourselves in 
turn. This is the usual form of defense, whose verv so^I 
should be the spirit of attack, but which, however, should 
never be resorted to unless the conditions make it abso- 

[66] 



82-83-84 
lutely necessary. Let us again repeat that the attack 
is the only thing that wins battles, and if compelled to 
assume the defensive we must not maintain that attitude 
any longer than is necessary, but must assume the offen- 
sive just as soon as we possibly can. 

82. Advantages of the Defense. The defense has 
these advantages over the attack: 

1. A larger amount of ammunition can be made 
available. 

2. The men undergo comparatively little fatigue 
and consequently can shoot better. 

3. The defense, usually having good cover, will 
suffer fewer losses than the attackers, and the use of 
smokeless powder makes it difficult for the attackers to 
locate the actual position of the defenders. 

4. The advancing attackers must sooner or later 
offer a good target. 

83. Disadvantages of the Defense. 1. The at- 
tacker can choose his point of attack, while the defender 
must be prepared against it at all points. 

2. The defender must generally fight amongst his 
dead and wounded, which is demoralizing. 

3. Seeing the attacker continuing to advance in 
spite of the defender's fire has a bad moral effect on the 
defender. 

84. Requisites of a good defensive Position. 

The requisites to be sought in a good defensive position 
are: 

1. A good field of fire to the front and flanks, to 
distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. 

[67] 



85 

2. Effective cover and concealment for the firing 
line as well as for the supports and reserves. 

3. Flanks that are naturally secure, or that can be 
made so by the use of reserves. 

4. Extent of ground suitable to the size of the force 
that is to occupy it. 

5. Good communications throughout the position — 
that is, between different parts of the firing line, between 
the firing line and the supports, and between the sup- 
ports and the reserves. 

6. A good line of retreat. 

7. The position should be one that the enemy can 
not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission. 

Of course, a position having all these advantages will 
rarely, if ever, be found. The one should be taken which 
conforms closest to the description. 




U>A 



Two of the most important requisites of a good de- 
fensive position, viz. : cover for the men and a good field 
of fire, are conflicting; for, as a rule, the farther back 
we get on the top of a hill, the better will the cover be, 
but, on the other hand, the farther back we get the more 
"dead space" will there be in front — that is to say, the 
poorer will the field of fire be. In selecting our fire posi- 
tion we must, therefore, balance these conflicting require- 
ments and strike a compromise between the two. 

85. Straight Lines, Best Form of Defense. Of 
course, the simplest and most effective form of defense 

[68] 



86-87 
is for the fire trench or trenches to be constructed in a 
straight line. However, with a command of any size 
this will rarely be possible ; for, we will find that, owing 
to the features of the ground, a straight line of any 
length will provide variable cover for the defense and a 
very ununiform field of fire to the front — in some parts 
the cover and field of fire will be excellent, and in others 
it will be very poor. We must, therefore, bear in mind 
that in selecting our fire-positions, the position of the 
defense as a whole must be considered. 

86. Salients. By salients we mean hills, spurs, 
woods, buildings, etc., that jut out from the general line 
of defense, and thus form a projecting object. Salients 
are always a weakness in a line, not only because it is 
easier for the enemy to concentrate a converging fire, 
especially artillery, on a small, projecting locality like a 
salient, which can often be enfiladed, but, generally, the 
number of men required to occupy a salient is out of 
proportion to the amount of the defenders' front covered 
by the salient. Hence, whenever possible, salients must 
be avoided and the space to their front and sides covered 
by the fire of troops occupying parts of the line adjoin- 
ing the salients. But, if this can not be done, and the 
occupation of a salient can not be avoided, special pains 
must be taken to provide overhead and other cover 
(bomb-proofs and loop-holes), and to guard against 
being enfiladed by the enemy. 

87. Avoidance of the Skyline. Generally when 
we speak of the "Skyline" in conversation, we mean the 
highest part of a hill or ridge — the "natural crest," — and, 
roughly speaking, the skyline and the natural crest are 

[69] 



87 (contd.) 

often practically the same. However, strictly speaking, 
such is not the case ; the exact position of the skyline is 
variable — it becomes nearer as one approaches the top 
of the hill and gets farther away as one goes away from 
the top of the hill. For instance, if standing at "A," 
Fig. 1, the skyline would be at "C," and if standing at 
' B" it would be at "D." The thing to do then, is to 
ascertain the point beyond which the enemy will proba- 
bly be unable to advance without gaining superiority of 
fire — that is to say, the position where he will make his 
fight for superiority of fire — and then fix the skyline 
with reference to that point. As we all know, objects 




Fig. 1 

seen on the skyline loom up as prominent targets. 
Furthermore, it is evident the occupation of the sky- 
line as a fire-position would result in lots of "dead 
space" in our front, and, again, it is a known fact that 
men will usually fire at this skyline rather than at any 
other part of a hill, if they cannot see the defenders' 
trenches. We should, therefore, if possible, avoid the 
skyline, and occupy a fire-position in front of it. How- 
ever, there may be occasions when the occupation of the 
skyline cannot be avoided. For instance, in the case of 
a plateau, with sudden and steep slopes down to the 

[70] 



88-89-90 
valleys below. Because of the vast amount of time and 
labor involved in cutting down the sides of the slope 
before getting to the trench proper, the construction of 
trenches on the slopes would be impossible — also, their 
concealment would be very difficult. When such a sky- 
line is occupied bushes should be placed along it — they 
will prevent the enemy from seeing the men when they 
rise to nre. ' f | 

If possible, before selecting a defensive position, go 
forward several hundred yards and examine it for the 
direction in which the. enemy will approach. 

88. Cover, Trenches, and Obstacles. The nat- 
ural cover of the position should be fully utilized, and, 
in addition, it should be strengthened by trenches and 
obstacles, if the time permits. 

The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, in- 
conspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much 
as practicable must be done. That the trenches may not 
be needed should not cause their construction to be 
omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed 
should not influence the action of a commander, if con- 
ditions are found to be other than expected. 

The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammu- 
nition. 

89. Supports. When natural cover is not available 
for the supports, they are placed close at hand in cover 
trenches. 

90. Dummy Trenches frequently deceive the ene- 
my and cause the hostile artillery as well as infantry to 
waste time and ammunition and to divert their fire. 



[71] 



91-92-93-94 

91. Advance Posts. As a rule, the occupation of 
positions in front of the general line of defense should 
be avoided, as they tend to disperse the power of the 
defender. However, there are times when it is desirable 
to occupy such positions in order to delay the enemy, 
deflect his course, make him deploy sooner, or for some 
other purpose. In such case, the number of troops used 
for the purpose should be no larger than is absolutely 
necessary, and care must be taken not to let them get 
cut off, special provision being made for their retreat. 
The commander of an advance post should always be 
given definite and explicit instructions as to just what 
he is to do and how long he is to occupy the position. 

92. Occupation of the Trenches. Unless the diffi- 
culty of moving the troops into the trenches be great, 
most of them should be held in rear until the infantry 
attack begins. The position itself would be occupied 
by a small garrison only, with the necessary out guards 
or patrols in front. 

93. Use of Bayonet. Fire alone cannot be de- 
pended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be 
determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary. 

94. Night Attack. If a night attack or close 
approach of the enemy is expected, patrols or outposts 
should be thrown out in front, troops in a nreuared 
position should strengthen the outeruards and firing line, 
and as many obstacles as nossible should be constructed. 
Supports and reserves should move close to the firing 
line and should, with the firing line, keen their bayonets 
fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, 
preferably from the flanks. 

[721 






95 
Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night 
attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. 

95. Buildings, Farm Inclosures, etc., should not 
be occupied by the defense, when it can be avoided, espe- 
cially if they are to be exposed to artillery fire. 

Buildings and farm inclosures are bad fire-positions, 
not only because they make excellent targets for the 
artillery, but also because the men in them are in a very 
confined place, usually crowded together, thus present- 
ing a vulnerable target. If a building exposed to artil- 
lery fire must be defended, it can usually be done better 
from the outside than from the inside. The field of fire 
from the outside is generally better, and it is easier and 
quicker to dig good trenches, even with head cover, than 
it is to loop-hool and otherwise prepare a building for 
defense. Again, the effect of the hostile artillery will 
not be so demoralizing outside of a house as inside of it, 
and the defenders will not be driven out by the building 
catching fire. However, if a building is not exposed to 
artillery fire and it also affords a good field of fire, there 
is no doubt that it affords a good means of resistance, as 
it is very difficult to assault a building, and by the use of 
sand bags and other material effective protection can be 
provided against infantry fire. In fighting inside a 
building the very strictest discipline must be maintained 
and every man made to do his full duty ; for, there is no 
doubt that many men who go into a building take no part 
in its defense. Men must be assigned to various rooms, 
and squad leaders and the one in general charge, must 
frequently visit the various parts of the building to see 
that every one is doing his duty. Precautions must be 

[73] 



96 

taken to guard against fire. In preparing a building j 
for defense, improve the field of fire in the vicinity as 
much as possible; provide water and heaps of earth in 
the rooms; break and remove the glass in all the win- 
dows; doors and windows on the ground floor that are 
accessible must be blocked up and loop-holed ; arrange 
for means of communication throughout the building 
and for means of retreat. Ordinary furniture, chairs, 
tables, cupboards, bedsteads, etc., make good obstacles. 
Boxes, chests, trunks, sacks, mattresses, bags and pillow 
cases, when filled with earth, afford protection against 
rifle fire. 

However, it is generally safer to avoid buildings, 
and if they must be defended, then to defend them from 
the outside. 

96. Edge of a Wood. If exposed to hostile artil- 
lery fire, the edge of a wood is not a good defensive posi- 
tion, because, as explained in the attack, it affords a good 
target for the enemy's artillery, and it also affords a 
good target for the hostile infantry. However, experi- 
ence in war shows that such a position is not a bad fire- 
position if not exposed to artillery fire, especially if the 
defenders happen to have some artillery to assist them. 
The trenches should be placed as far back as possible 
inside the wood, so as to escape the heavy fire that is sure 
to be directed against the edge of the wood. However, 
care must be taken not to locate the trenches so far back 
that the field of fire will be obstructed. 

The principal advantage of such a position is that 
the supports can be brought up and the wounded re- 
moved from the trenches under the cover of the woods. 

[74] 



97 
97. Clearing in a Wood. A clearing in a wood, 
especially if it be two or three hundred yards wide and 
the farther side be exposed to the defenders' fire, makes 
a good defensive position. This is not due so much to the 
fact that the defense has good cover and a good field of 
fire as it is to the fact that it is only with great difficulty 
that the attack can make an organized advance out of 
the wood. However, such a position is better suited to 
a passive defense, as it is about as difficult for the de- 
fender to deliver a counter-attack from his edge of the 
wood as it is for the attacker to move forward from his 
side, but the defender has a slight advantage over the 
attacker in this respect, in that he can prepare before- 
hand paths for purposes of communication, and also in 
that he will not have suffered the casualties and been 
subjected to the confusion which the attacker has experi- 
enced while passing through the wood. 

If necessary to make a clearing in a wood, it must be 
done by cutting down trees and clearing out the under- 
growth. Of course, as a rule, it will not be possible to 
cut down all the trees and the largest ones will have to 
be left standing. However, the spaces between the trees 
left standing must be assigned to various units, so that 
our fire will be sure to be distributed along the entire 
front. Any logs that may be left should lie at right 
angles to the defenders' front so as not to afford any 
cover for the enemy. The enemy's side of the clearing 
should be cut in the shape of a W, with the pointed 
angles toward the defenders. • This will cause the attack- 
ers to crowd into the pointed angles and to form along 
the edges of the angles, thus affording vulnerable tar- 

[75] 



97 (contd.) 

gets, exposed to an enfilading fire from the defender. 
This saw-tooth effect on the attackers' side, in order to 
reduce the amount of labor, would be produced as fol- 
lows: After the clearing has been made, cut indenta- 
tions (A, B, C, D) in the woods, a few yards apart. 

t|f/ %7 %0 

Place the limbs and other material from these indenta- 
tions at W, X, Y, Z, in the form of angles. If the 
time and labor permit, and if we have a couple of 
machine-guns, so that one can be placed at each flank of 
the clearing, our position can be made almost impreg- 
nable by cutting two rides running like a V, with the 
point towards the enemy, so that the machine-guns can 
shoot down the rides. Before being able to reach the 
edge of the clearing the enemy would have to cross the 
V-shaped paths and would be mowed down by the 
machine-guns. 

In making a clearing always begin on the defenders' 
side, and as the work progresses, keep the width of the 
clearing about the same throughout its entire length; 
for, if compelled to stop suddenly before the desired 
width is reached, it is better to have a narrower clearing 
of uniform width than one with some points of the far 
side near the defenders' position and others far away. 

When necessary to occupy a fire-position in a wood, 
with no clearing and without time to make one, whether 
or not the position is to be entrenched, always occupy the 
highest ground available. There is no theoretical reason 
for this, but experience shows that in wood fighting the 

[761 






98 
severest struggles almost invariably take place on the 
highest ground, and success depends upon ability to hold 
such ground. It may be that this is due to the fact that 
in nearly all wood fighting the bayonet is a great factor, 
and it can be used with greater effect in rushing down 
hill than in charging up hill. 

98. Clearing Field of Fire. If there is not a good 
field of fire to the front, we must improve the field as 
much as possible by clearing away all obstructing objects. 
However, in clearing the ground close to the trench, we 
must be very careful not to create what will appear to the 
enemy like a straight line, because it will give him a good 
idea of the location of the trench, and probably unneces-. 
sarily expose the defenders to view. Bushes and scrub 
that do not interfere with the field of fire and which, 
when seen from the front, do not present a clearly defined 
line, should not be cut down, as they make it difficult for 
the enemy to locate the trenches or see the defenders, 
when they put up their heads to fire. 

A Wood. The method of clearing a wood was ex- 
plained above. 

Crops. Crops that cannot be burned may be trampled 
down by having troops march over them in close order. 

Streams running across the front within effective 
rifle range should be cleared of all obstructions to view, 
so that the defense will be able to fire on both banks and 
on the approaches. However, a few trees or bushes 
should be left here and there along the banks as aiming 
marks to assist the squad leaders and platoon commanders 
in directing and distributing the fire of their men. 



im 



99-100 

Ranges. The ranges to various points in front and 
on the flanks must be ascertained in advance. 

Obstacles. The extent to which artificial obstacles 
shall be used will depend upon the necessity therefor as 
determined by the nature of the ground, the extent to 
which it is intended to defend the position, and the time 
and material available. 

99. Defense of Bridges and other Defiles. As a 
rule, a bridge, causeway, ford, or other open defile, can 
be defended better from the near side — that is to say, 
from the defenders' side — by bringing a cross-fire upon 
the defile the enemy is attempting to pass. Everything 
possible must be done to prevent him from forming a 
fighting front on the defenders' side. 

In defending mountain passes or other defiles whose 
flanks are not open, such as village streets, it is usually 
better to dispute the passage itself, inch by inch, and 
prepare to receive the enemy with a strong, effective 
cross-fire should he succeed in reaching the open space 
at the defenders' end of the defile. 

100. Defense of Villages. To prepare a village 
for defense: 

1. Construct trenches controlling the principle 
avenues of approach, which should, if practicable, be 
mined; station sharpshooters and expert riflemen in the 
belfries of churches and other commanding places, and 
construct barricades across the streets where heavy fight- 
ing is likely to occur. 

2. Divide the village into sections, with well-defined 
lines of communication, each section being held by a 

[78] 



101 

separate tactical unit, which will provide for the care of 
the wounded. 

3. Prepare the buildings for defense, provide food, 
water, and ammunition. (Buildings prepared for occu- 
pation must not be occupied if sub j ected to artillery fire. ) 

Should the attackers penetrate the outer line of de- 
fense, the defenders must stubbornly contest every inch 
of the ground, fighting from buildings, barricades, and 
trenches. 

101. Defense against Cavalry. Infantry, unless 
taken by surprise or demoralized, need fear nothing from 
cavalry. All you need to do is not to lose your head, 
shoot straight and aim low. The kneeling position is 
usually the best. If attacked by a cavalryman with a 
drawn saber, try to get on the near side of the horse. The 
rider cannot use his saber effectively against a dismounted 
man on his left. 



[79] 



102 



Chapter XI 
THE COMPANY IN DEFENSE 

Usual Types of Defense 

102. Having discussed the general rules and princi- 
ples of defense, we will now take the company through 
the usual types of defense, viz. : 

1. The ordinary type of defense, where there are 
many companies assisted by artillery, occupying a posi- 
tion for the purporse of fighting entirely on the defen- 
sive; or, for the purpose of fighting on the defensive, 
with the view of taking the offensive later. 

2. An advance guard is suddenly thrown on the 
defensive by the action of the enemy. 

3. An attack is suddenly thrown on the defensive 
by the action of the enemy. 

4. An advance guard that has routed the enemy 
and captured the position is in turn attacked by the 
enemy and thrown on the defensive. 

5. An attack that has routed the enemy and cap- 
tured the position, is, in turn, attacked by the enemy and 
thrown on the defensive. 

6. A rear guard covering the withdrawal of a force 
from the battlefield. 

7. Defense at night. 

8. Defense of a position by an outpost. 

Many Companies, Assisted by Artillery, Occupy- 
ing a Position for the Purpose of Fighting Entire- 
ly rn the Defensive; or, for the Purpose of 

[80] 



103 

Fighting on the Defensive with the View of 

Taking the Offensive Later 

103. It may be assumed that in this type of defense 
there will be sufficient time to dig fire trenches, con-- 
struct obstacles, and clear the foreground. 

The location of the fire trenches will, to a great 
extent, depend upon the amount of time available ; for, 
a fire trench that is well located when the foreground is 
cleared, or some obstacle constructed, may be very badly 
placed if there is not enough time to do more than to 
prepare hasty entrenchments. When allotted the 
amount of front he is to defend, the company command- 
er should, therefore, ascertain, if possible, about how 
much time he will have to strengthen his position. 

The first thing for the company commander to 
decide, is whether he will begin work by digging his 
fire trench, clearing the foreground or constructing 
obstacles, and it is impossible to lay down any definite 
rule, except it may be said that, generally, artificial 
obstacles are luxuries, and as such would be the last to 
receive attention. However, it is not always easy to 
determine which should be done first — the fire trenches 
dug, or foreground cleared. 

For example, if the position should be taken up in 
the afternoon and our outposts were well out to the front, 
it is not likely that the enemy would make a decisive 
attack before the following day, even though our ad- 
vance guard may have been in action against the enemy's 
advanced troops. In such a case it would be better to 
employ a few men to work on the position of the fire 
trenches and construct a certain amount of cover, while 

[81] 



103 (contd.) 

the rest of the company cleared the foreground, as it is 
comparatively easy to dig trenches at night, but it is not 
so easy to site them, or to clear the foreground in dark- 
ness. 

If the position selected for the fire trench is very 
exposed to the enemy's fire, which would mean that the 
ground in front must be fairly open, it would be best to 
begin work digging trenches with the majority of the 
company and let the remainder clear away the most 
serious obstacles. 

If the position selected for the fire trench is natural- 
ly strong and provides more cover for the defenders than 
the attackers could possibly get within iive or six hundred 
yards of the position, it would then be better to improve 
the field of fire, by clearing the foreground, before dig- 
ging any trenches, especially if there happens to be con- 
siderable obstruction to our fire, and view. 

Should the section of the line allotted to the company 
run through a wood, we should first make a clearing, 
then construct obstacles on the enemy's side of the clear- 
ing and dig the fire trench last. 

The one salient, important fact we must always bear 
in mind is this : The defender must prevent the attacker 
from gaining sujjeriority of fire. In some cases the de- 
fender may accomplish this object better by digging his 
fire trenches first and in other cases by clearing the fore- 
ground first, depending upon circumstances, and in decid- 
ing which shall be done first, the company commander 
must use his judgment and common sense. With regard 
to obstacles it may be said that they can only delay the 
attack, but will not prevent it from gaining superiority 

[82] 



104 

of fire. It is most important, therefore, that we should 
first determine as nearly as possible the position that the 
attacker can reach but cannot pass without gaining 
superiority of fire, and then plan accordingly with regard 
to locating the fire trench, clearing the foreground, and 
constructing obstacles, so that we may be in the best pos- 
sible circumstances to prevent the enemy from subduing 
our fire. 

An Advance Guard Is Suddenly Thrown on the 
Defensive by the Action of the Enemy 
104. In this case the first thing to do is to occupy as 
soon as possible the best fire position available in the 
immediate neighborhood. It is all the better if this posi- 
tion should happen to be ahead — the very fact of the 
company advancing, even though a few yards, will help 
to improve the morale of the men. However, if it is 
out of the question to advance, and it is extremely proba- 
ble that the position we occupy cannot be held without 
soon losing superiority of fire, then a fire-position must be 
occupied in rear, but we must not fall back a single foot 
more than is absolutely necessary. We must remember 
that reinforcements are close behind us, and that any 
wavering or hasty retreat on our part may easily lead to 
disaster. Every inch of ground must be stubbornly con- 
tested, and immediately upon reaching a good fire posi- 
tion, we must defend it to the last. Let the company 
commander and everyone else bear in mind that the 
safety of the whole of the main body in rear and the 
success of the subsequent battle may depend upon the 
vigorous, determined action of the advanced guard. 



£83] 






105 

An Attack Is Suddenly Thrown on the Defensive 
by the Action of the Enemy 

105. If the attacking force should be suddenly 
thrown on the defensive by the enemy, the first object 
of the company commander should be to resume the 
offensive just as soon as he possibly can, seizing the very 
first opportunity to renew the attack, and then, at the 
earliest possible moment gain superiority of fire, advance 
to a position close enough to charge, and charge. Natur- 
ally enough, the ground will not be the same in front 
of all the companies, and those that are favored by the 
terrain should push forward and thus relieve the strain 
on those that are not so fortunate in that respect. The 
momentum of the companies that thus press forward 
will carry along other companies less fortunately situ- 
ated. We should remember that the longer the company 
remains on the defensive the harder will it be to have it 
resume the attack. As in the case of the advance guard, 
we should not fall back, if it can possibly be avoided; 
for, if we do, other companies will probably follow suit — 
retreating is very infectious, and it works on the cumula- 
tive principle of a snowball rolling down the side of a 
hill. Indeed, it is generally better to continue occupying 
an indifferent fire-position than to seek a better one 
farther back. We must also remember that reinforce- 
ments will be coming up as rapidly as possible to help us, 
and their arrival should be the signal for a forward move. 
An advance of only a few yards will often change the 
whole moral aspect of the situation. 



t«4] 



106 
An Advance Guard that Has Routed the Enemy and 
Captured the Position, Is in Turn Attacked by 
the Enemy and Thrown on the Defensive 

106. The situation is this: Our advance guard has 
defeated the leading troops of the enemy, and is in pos- 
session of the ground; the leading troops of the enemy 
are being heavily reenf orced with the view of retaking 
the ground they lost. How should we meet the situa- 
tion? To begin with, our attack having been successful, 
not only is the morale of our troops very high, but, also, 
the advance guard commander will be able to make more 
elaborate arrangements than would be possible in any 
ordinary meeting engagement. 

When the advance guard drove the leading troops 
of the enemy from their position it did all that was re- 
quired of it for the time being; it is now merely called 
upon to retain the ground it has taken from the enemy. 

Assuming that we made our attack as we should, it 
was a somewhat rapid operation with a very strong firing 
line from the beginning — hence, it is not likely that the 
companies are badly mixed up. 

The first thing for the company commander to do is 
to reorganize his company, and get the squads and pla- 
toons under their proper commanders. He must then 
choose and occupy the best fire-position available. Let us 
suppose the position where we now find ourselves is bad 
for defense and that any further attack would involve the 
advance guard in a premature action against the enemy's 
main bodv. It would be necessary for some of the com- 
panies to remain in the position gained and act as an 
outpost, while the rest of the companies would be with- 
es*] 



106 (contd.) 

drawn to a better defensive position shortly in rear. Of 
course, it would be quite impossible to improve any of the 
foreground that is exposed to the enemy's fire. How- 
ever, other parts might be cleared. Also, as a rule, we 
would have to confine our entrenchments to such as the 
men can make with their entrenching tools while lying 
down. We, therefore, see we must so choose our fire 
position as to make the most of the ground as it exists, 
and, consequently, the chances are it will be most difficult 
to insure even a fairly straight line of defense. How- 
ever, we should by all means avoid pronounced salients 
in our position. (See "Salients," Par. 683.) 

If we are compelled to occupy a bad or indifferent 
fire-position, we must then make the best of the situation 
by assuming a very active defense with counter-attacks. 
Remember, fire-positions are bad, as a rule, because the 
terrain in front is such that it is easy for the attacker to 
advance under cover, gain superiority of fire, assemble 
close to the defenders and charge, — and these are the 
very advantages the defender will have when he assumes 
the offensive and delivers a counter-attack over the 
same ground; the tables being turned, the enemy will 
have a bad fire-position, and it will be easy for the de- 
fender to advance under cover, gain superiority of fire, 
assemble close to the enemy, and charge. 

Any fire-position that may be selected must be im- 
proved by intrenching as much as the enemy's fire will 
permit. By means of scouts arid patrols sent out to the 
front and flanks, we must get all the information we 
can about the enemy — his exact position, whether he is 
intrenching, etc. 

[86] 



107 

After our previous fight during the attack of the 
advance guard, the men will be badly in need of water, 
and the company commander should arrange as soon as 
possible for them to get water. 

There is one thing that every one (officers, noncom- 
missioned officers, and privates) must understand: The 
safety of our main body and probably the success of the 
approaching battle will depend upon the defense of the 
position we are now occupying, and which we secured 
at the sacrifice of many casualties. It must,, therefore, 
be held at all cost. 

An Attack that Has Routed the Enemy and Cap- 
tured the Position, Is in Turn Attacked by the 
Enemy and Thrown on the Defensive 

107. Although this situation is, in the main, but a 
modification of the one we have just discussed, it is easier 
to handle; for, the main body being involved, there are 
more troops available for the purpose, and the troops are 
even in higher spirits than in the preceding case. 

The first thing to do is to push forward with the men 
who have just charged, and secure a good fire-position on 
the enemy's side. We will find our companies badly dis- 
organized and mixed up with men of other companies and 
of other regiments. As we push forward the men, under 
the direction of officers and noncommissioned officers, 
should be grouping themselves into squads, platoons, and 
companies, corporals taking charge of squads, platoon 
leaders grouping two or three squads together under 
their command, and captains assuming control of several 
of these groups. A fire-position must be established on 

[87] 



108 

the enemy's side of the locality, because he must be pur- 
sued immediately by fire to prevent his reforming; we 
must be prepared to repulse without delay, by fire and 
assault, any hostile counter-attack that may be attempt- 
ed; ground must be gained to the front so that our 
artillery can come up in safety and assist us in the fire 
pursuit of the enemy, and in resisting any counter- 
attack ; and time must be gained to enable our troops in 
rear to reform and prepare for further offensive opera- 
tions, either by way of continuing the attack or pressing 
the pursuit. 

Having secured a good fire-position, we must next 
fix aiming marks and take ranges, and complete the 
reorganization of the companies, getting the officers, 
noncommissioned officers, and privates of the same regi- 
ment together in squads, platoons, and companies. 

The replenishment of the ammunition will be looked 
after by the proper field and staff officers. 

Let us all bear in mind that whatever the circum- 
stances may be, it is the duty of each and every one of us 
in the front line to advance just as soon as the enemy is 
driven back, and occupy a fire-position that will secure 
the ground we have captured. 

A Rear Guard Covering the Withdrawal of a Force 

from the Battlefield 

108. This type of defense is different from the 
others we have so far discussed, in that it is strictly 
passive, and special attention must be given to the suc- 
cessful withdrawal of the company as soon as it has 
accomplished its object. 

C88] 



108 (contd.) 
The object of the operation is to give the main body 
time to reorganize and retire in good order. The pro- 
cedure followed by a rear guard is quite simple. The 
companies are deployed on a wide front with few sup- 
ports and no reserves. When the enemy has been made 
to deploy and attack us, or has been compelled to work 
around our flank, and we have occupied our position as 
long as is safe, a part of the rear guard retires under 
the covering fire of the other part, and occupies another 
position in rear, from which it can cover the retirement 
of the other part. Whether the right of the line should 
retire first, to be followed later by the left, or whether 
the center should withdraw first, or whether both flanks 
should withdraw first, leaving the center to follow 
later — these are matters to be determined by the nature 
of the ground and the comparative pressure of the attack 
that is brought against different parts of the line. The 
decision as to which company should retire first will rest 
with the officer in local command of the companies, but 
in the absence of specific orders, a company that is de- 
fending the only locality from which the line of retreat 
is visible, or that is holding a position commanding part 
of the rest of the line, would be last to retire. As a 
rule, before retiring, an officer or well trained noncom- 
missioned officer should be sent back to ascertain the 
general line of defense in the next position in rear, and 
to reconnoiter suitable fire-positions, thus enabling the 
company commander to take his new position without 
delay. In case of broken country and considerable dis- 
tance between the companies, scouts should be posted 
on our flanks to let us know when the adjoining com- 

[89] 



108 (contd.) 

panies begin to withdraw. The actual withdrawal must 
be made in fighting formation, and as rapidly as possible, 
so as to increase the distance between the enemy and 
ourselves. Also, rapid withdrawal and prompt occu- 
pation of the next position, will enable us to delay the 
enemy more than we could by a running fight. 

In selecting fire-positions we must remember that 
in addition to the conflicting requirements of a good field 
of fire and good cover for the defenders, the position 
must also permit the company to withdraw easily. In 
other words, the fire-position must permit of such easy 
withdrawal that when the company falls back it will be 
able to gain cover in rear before the enemy can occupy 
the position that the company has just vacated, and this 
is something we want to remember; for, it makes un- 
suitable certain fire-positions which, under other circum- 
stances, would be very desirable. For example, the foot 
of a slope in open country with a bare hillside in rear, 
although affording a fine field of fire and splendid cover 
for the defenders, would not be selected because of the 
difficulty of withdrawing over the hill and the casualties 
that would doubtless result. In such a case as this, the 
top of the hill, even with lots of dead ground imme- 
diately in front of it, would be a much more suitable 
position. The principle to work on is this: Our object 
is to delay the enemy in his advance, bring him to a 
standstill as far as possible from our position, and force 
him to obtain superiority of fire before getting any 
closer; we have no intention of standing a charge and 
consequently dead ground in our immediate front is 
immaterial; for, we will have retired before the enemy 

[90] 



109 

reaches that dead space. What we must do, then, is to 
select fire-positions that command all ground from about 
two hundred to eight hundred yards in front of the 
locality we are defending. 

Care must be taken, especially in open country, to 
protect our flanks against hostile cavalry. 

There is a great deal of ammunition expended in rear 
guard action, and the ammunition supply must receive 
the attention of the company commander. 

Defense at Night 

109. Level open ground is the best kind of ground 
over which to make a night attack; for, it is easy to 
traverse in the darkness. However, a defensive position 
with that kind of ground in front of it will have by day 
a good field of fire and will require comparatively few 
troops to defend it. We, therefore, see that, as a rule, 
those parts of the defensive line that are strongest by 
day are the most liable to attack by night. Of course, 
there are some exceptions to this, because, for example, 
a morass, vineyard, or other natural obstacle in front of 
a portion of the line, may make that part of the ground 
as impassable by night as by day. 

Obstacles are useful for delaying or breaking up 
night attacks, especially if their location is unknown to 
the enemy and there are troops stationed close to prevent 
their destruction. 

The best way to guard against night attacks is to 
have the front of the position well patrolled, and to throw 
out outposts, protected by artificial obstacles. If the out- 
posts are forced to retire, the enemy's advance will be 

[91] 



110 

discovered and a night attack can be made upon him. 
In connection with the use of obstacles for night work, 
it may be remarked that they should not be visible by 
day. The company must, therefore, be able to construct 
obstacles in the darkness, and should be trained to do so 
in time' of peace. 

Experience has shown that, taken all in all, the bayo- 
net is the most important and reliable weapon we have 
for night fighting. However, the bayonet cannot be 
used effectively behind entrenchments — its great power 
and value is when in the hands of well-trained men who 
are prepared to charge, without even firing a shot, as 
soon as the enemy has been located. If the enemy can 
attack at night, there is no reason why we cannot do the 
same, even though we may be on the defensive for the 
time being. 

The whole situation may, therefore, be summed up 
in these few words: When acting on the defensive at 
night the whole position must be watched by sentries and 
patrols; the most probable avenues of approach must 
be obstructed by obstacles, with outposts behind them, 
ready to delay the enemy and prevent the destruction of 
the obstacles; and as soon as the enemy has been located, 
if advancing to attack vis, companies must be sent out to 
attack him with the bayonet — from which we see that 
by far the most important part of defense by night is an 
attack or counter-attack. 

Defense of a Position by an Outpost 

110. This type of defense is treated in detail in the 
following chapter, "The Company on Outpost." 



[92] 



Ill 



Chapter XII 
THE COMPANY ON OUTPOST 

Establishing the Outpost 

111. Let us suppose that our battalion has been 
detailed for outpost duty. 

. In order to understand more fully the duties and 
functions of the company commander, we will first con- 
sider what the major does." To begin with, he and the 
battalion will have been detailed for outpost duty before 
the march was completed, and he will have been told, 
amongst other things, what is known of the enemy and 
also what is known of other bodies of our own troops, 
where the main body will halt, the general position to be 
occupied by the outpost, and what the commander in- 
tends doing in case of attack. 

The major verbally designates, say, two companies, 
as the reserve, and the other two companies, including 
our own, as the support. He places the senior officer of 
the reserve companies in command of the reserve and 
tells him where he is to go, and he indicates the general 
line the outpost is to occupy and assigns the amount of 
front each of the other companies is to cover. The limits 
of the sector so assigned should be marked by some dis- 
tinctive features, such as trees, buildings, woods, streams, 
etc., as it is important that each company should know 
the exact limits of its frontage. He tells the company 
commanders what he knows of the enemy and of our own 
troops so far as they affect the outposts, he indicates the 

[93] 



Ill (contd.) 

line of resistance and how much resistance is to b 
afforded in case of attack, states whether intrenchments 
and obstacles are to be constructed, gives instructions 
about lighting fires and cooking, and states where he 
can be found. 

Upon receiving his orders from the major, the com- 
pany commander, with a proper covering detachment, 
moves to the locality allotted him and as he arrives upon 
the ground he is to occupy, he sends out, as temporary 
security, patrols or skirmishers, or both, a short distance 
in front of the general position the outguards will 
occupy, holding the rest of the company back under 
cover. If practicable, the company commander should 
precede the company and make a rapid examination of 
the ground. He then sends out observation groups, 
varying in size from four men to a platoon, generally a 
squad, to watch the country in the direction of the enemy. 
These groups constitute the outguards, and are just 
sufficient in number to cover the front of the supports, 
and to connect where necessary with the outguards of 
adjoining supports. 

The company commander next selects a defensive 
position on the general line of resistance, from which not 
only can he command the approaches, but where he can 
also give assistance to the adjoining supports; he then 
gives instructions in regard to the intrenchments and 
obstacles, after which he makes a more careful recon- 
naissance of the section assigned him ; corrects the posi- 
tion of the outguards, if necessary ; gives them instruc- 
tions as to their duties in case of attack or when strangers 
approach their posts; tells them the number (if any) of 

[94] 



; 



Ill (contd.) 
their post, the number of the outguard and support and 
the numbers of the adjoining outguards and supports; 
points out lines of retreat in case they are compelled to 
fall back to the support, cautioning the men not to mask 
the fire of the support; he tells them the names of all 
villages, rivers, etc., in view, and the places to which the 
wagon roads and the railroads lead; selects, if necessary, 
places for additional posts to be occupied at night and 
during fog; sees that suitable connections are made be- 
tween him and the adjoining outguards, and between his 
support and the adjoining supports; and questions sub- 
ordinate commanders to test their grasp of the situation 
and knowledge of their duties, and on returning to the 
support he sends a report with a sketch to the outpost 
commander, showing the dispositions made. 

After the line of observation has been established, 
the support stacks arms and the men are permitted to 
remove their equipments, except cartridge belts. One 
or more sentinels are posted over these supports, and 
they guard the property and watch for signals from the 
outguards. Fires are concealed as much as possible and 
the messing is done by reliefs. Mounted messengers 
ordinarily do not unsaddle; they rest, water, and feed 
as directed. 

After the major has received reports from both com- 
pany commanders, he will himself visit the outguards 
and supports and make such changes as he may deem 
necessary, immediately after which he will submit to the 
commander of the troops a written reuort, accompanied 
by a combined sketch showing the positions of the differ- 
ent parts of the outpost. The major might begin his 

[95] 



Ill (contd.) 

inspection of the line of outguards before receiving the 

reports of the company commanders. 

In training and instructing the company in outpost 
work, it is always best to send out a few patrols and 
scouts an hour or two in advance, with definite instruc- 
tions as to what they are to do, and have them operate 
against the company as hostile scouts and patrols. If 
the rest of the company know that patrols and scouts 
are operating in their front, and will try to work their 
way through the outpost line, they will naturally take 
a keener interest in their work. Exercises of this kind 
create a feeling of rivalry between the scouts and patrols, 
who, on the one hand, are trying to work their way 
through the line of outposts, and the outguards and 
patrols, who, on the other hand, are trying to prevent 
them from so doing. It makes the work much more 
human. 



[96] 



112 



Chapter XIII 
FIELD ORDERS OF ENLISTED MEN 

112. Platoon Leaders 

My field orders are — 

Integrity of squads in battle. In battle I will do 
all I can to preserve the integrity of squads ; I will desig- 
nate new squad leaders to replace those disabled, and will 
organize new squads when necessary. 

Designation of target. I will clearly describe to 
my platoon the target that has been allotted to the pla- 
toon by the captain, and will take every precaution to 
insure correct sight setting, and proper distribution of 
fire by carefully observing the target, the adjacent 
ground, and the effect upon the enemy. In the absence 
of the allotment of a target to my platoon, I will take 
as my target that part of the hostile line corresponding 
to the position of my platoon in the company. If the 
target cannot be seen with the naked eye, I will select 
an object in front of or behind it, designate this as the 
aiming target, and direct a sight setting which will carry 
the cone of fire into the target. 

Fire control. On the firing line I will be on the 
lookout for commands and signals from the captain; T 
will observe the target and the effect of the fire and will 
also observe and regulate the rate of fire. When the 
target is favorable, I will increase the fire; when it is 
unfavorable, I will decrease the fire, and when the enemy 
disappears I will stop firing. 

[97] 



112 (contd.) 

Teamwork back of firing line. I realize that, in 
order to have proper fire direction and control, teamwork 
back of the firing line, — that is, between the captain and 
the platoon leaders and between the platoon leaders and 
the squad leaders, — is of vital importance. I also realize 
that such teamwork is impossible without the best possi- 
ble communication between the captain and the platoon 
leaders and between the platoon leaders and the squad 
leaders. Therefore, I will at all times endeavor to keep 
in sight of both the captain and the squad leaders of my 
platoon. Should I, for any reason, have to lose sight of 
the captain, I will designate a guide or someone from 
the firing line to get between the cantain and myself and 
keep us both in view, so as to be able to transmit to me 
at once any signals from the captain. 

Increasing rate of fire in platoon rushes. When 
the company is advancing by platoon rushes, I will 
always, in order not to decrease the volume of our fire, 
increase the rate of fire of my platoon, from the time 
that the adjoining platoon ceases firing nreuaratory to 
rushing forward, until it has completed its rush and 
resumed firing. 

Announcement of new range. When mv nlatoon 
advances bv rushes, I will, as soon as the platoon is halted, 
announce the rano'e of the new nosition, obtaining it, if 
practicable, from the platoon that preceded me. 

Direction of advance. In advancing: with mv pla- 
toon, I will constantly bear in mind the direction of 
advance, and will make every possible effort to maintain 
that direction. 



[98] 



112 (contd.) 
Ammunition supply. I will, through the squad 
leaders of my platoon, keep tab on how the ammunition 
is going. When it gets down to about 100 rounds per 
man, I will so notify the captain by opening and extend- 
ing the five fingers of the hand twice (the five fingers 
signifying 5 times ten, or 50, and twice that being 100) . 
When it gets down to about 50 rounds per man, I will 
again notify the captain by opening and extending the 
five fingers of the hand once. 

Sending out connecting files. In sending out con- 
necting files of the advance guard I will always instruct 
them from what element they are to take and maintain 
their distances. 

Signal lookouts. When advance or rear guard con- 
necting files, or flanking parties are sent out from my 
platoon, I will always designate someone in the platoon 
to act as a lookout for signals from such connecting files 
or flanking parties. 

Teamwork. I realize the value of TEAMWORK 
in the military business and I appreciate the force of 
what is said on the subject in the last subparagraph of 
Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in camp, on the march, 
and at all other times, I will see that the guides, squad 
leaders, buglers, and privates around me carry out their 
field orders, and that they comply with the known wishes 
and desires of the company commander, and I will my- 
self obey and carry out so much of the field orders of 
guides, squad leaders, and the privates as may at any 
time apply to me. 

Importance of platoon leader. I am fully aware 
of the fact that in modern war the platoon leader occu- 

[99] 



113 

pies a most important position, — a position as important 
as that occupied by a captain up to and during the Civil 
War. I also know that in order to make good as a pla- 
toon leader, a man must be forceful and efficient, and 
must exercise initiative, good judgment, and energy, 
and not be afraid to swim in deep water. In other words, 
he must be a "live wire," and that is exactly what I am 
going to make every effort to be, trying with all my 
might, — with my whole body and soul. 

113. Guides 

My field orders are — 

Integrity of squads in battle. In battle I will en- 
deavor, by assisting the officers and platoon leaders and 
otherwise, to preserve the integrity of squads. 

Watching firing line. On the firing line I will 
watch the line, observing the fire and checking every 
breach of fire discipline 1 that I see. 

Teamwork back of firing line. I realize the truth 
of what is said in paragraph 3, above, about the impor- 
tance of teamwork back of the firing line, and I will 
assist all I can in keeping up communication between 
the captain and my platoon leader, and between the pla- 
toon leader and the firing line, using initiative and com- 
mon sense to accomplish that end. 

Teamwork in general. I know the great value of 
TEAMWORK in the military business and I appre- 
ciate the force of what is said on the subject in the last 
subparagraph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in 

1 Bv fire discipline is meant taking advantage of cover: care in setting the 
sight, and delivery of fire; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful 
observation of the enemv; an increase of fire when the target is favorable, and a 
cessation of fire when the enemv disappears: economy of ammunition. 

(Pars. 418-419, Small-Arms Firing Manual.) 

[100] 



114 

camp, on the march, and at all other times, I will see that 
the squad leaders, buglers, and privates around me carry 
out their field orders, and that they comply with the 
known wishes and desires of the company commander, 
and I will myself obey and carry out so much of the 
field orders of squad leaders and the privates as may 
at any time apply to me. 

Direction of advance. I will constantly bear in 
mind the direction of advance, and will assist all I can 
in maintaining that direction. 

114. Squad Leaders 

My field orders are — 

Integrity of the squad. In battle I will do all I can 
to preserve the integrity of my squad. 

Signals from platoon leader. I will be constantly 
on the alert for commands and signals from my platoon 
leader and when necessary will transmit them to the 
members of my squad. 

Observing the squad. I will observe the conduct 
of my squad, abate excitement, and assist in enforcing 
fire discipline. 

Firing. I will participate in the firing, but not to 
such an extent as to interfere with the proper supervision 
and control of my squad. 

Increasing rate of fire in squad rushes. When the 
advance is being made by squad rushes, I will always, in 
order not to decrease the volume of our fire, increase the 
rate of fire of my squad, from the time that the adjoining 
squad ceases firing preparatory to rushing forward, until 
it has completed its rush and resumed firing. 

[101] 



114 (contd.) 

Announcement of new range. When my squad 
advances by rushes, I will, as soon as the squad is halted, 
announce the range of the new position, obtaining it, if 
practicable, from the squad that preceded me. 

Ammunition supply. I will keep tab on how the 
ammunition in my squad is going, instructing each man 
to inform me when his ammunition gets down to 100 
rounds and again when he has only 50 rounds left. 
When the majority of the members of the squad have 
so reported in each case, I will notify my platoon leader 
by holding up my hand, and opening and extending the 
five fingers twice to indicate 100 rounds, and once to 
indicate 50 rounds (the idea being that the five fingers 
signify 5 times 10, or 50). 

Posting sentinels on outpost. When posting a sen- 
tinel on outpost, I will always give him the following 
information : 

(a) The number of his post and the number of his 
out guard. 

(b) The location of the adjoining sentinels. 

(c) The numbers of the adjoining outguards. 

(d) The location of the support of his outguard and 
the line of retreat to follow if compelled to fall back. 

(e) Exactly what to do if the enemy appears and if 
attacked. 

(f ) Everything I know about the enemy; the names 
of villages, mountains, streams, and other prominent 
features in sight; where all the roads in sight lead to. 

If unable to impart all of the above information 
when the sentinel is posted, I will give as much as I 

[102] 



115 

know, and the rest as soon as possible, getting it from 
the commander of our support. 

Teamwork. I know how invaluable TEAM- 
WORK is- in the military game, and I appreciate the 
force of what is said on the subject in the last subpara- 
graph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in camp, on the 
march, and at all other times, I will see that the buglers 
and privates around me carry out their field orders, and 
that they comply with the known wishes and desires of 
the company commander, and I will myself obey and 
carry out so much of the field orders of the privates as 
apply to me. 

115. Buglers 

My field orders are — 

Post in deployment. Whenever the company is 
deployed, I will at once join the captain and remain with 
him until further orders. 

Assisting the captain. I will assist the cantain by 
observing the enemy, the target, and the fire-effect, by 
transmitting commands or signals, and by watching for 
signals. 

In case the company is acting in battalion, I will be 
on the constant lookout for orders and signals from the 
battalion commander, which I will at once transmit to 
the captain. 

Signals. I will memorize the following code of sig- 
nals, and in case I am required to make them, I will con- 
ceal them from the enemy's view: 



no3] 



115 (contd.) 



Letter of 
rlnlmbet 



AM.. 
C C C 



OF 

D T 

F 

F B 

PL 

G 

H H H 

K 

L T 



(Ardois and 
semaphore 
only ) 

(All methods 
but ardois 
and sema- 
phore ) 

P 

R 

R N 

R T 

s s s 

S U F 

T 



If signi led from the rear 
to t h e firing li^e 

Ammi nition going forward. . . . 
Charge (mandatory at all times) 

Cease firing 

Double time or "rush" 

Commence firing 

Fix bayonets 

Artil'ery fire is causing us losses 

M>ve forward 

Halt 

Negative 

Left 

What is the (R. N., etc.)? 
Interrogatory 



What is the (R. 
Interrogatory 



N., etc.)? 



Affirmative 

Acknowledgment 

Ringe 

Right 

SupDort going forward 

Suspend firing 

Tm-o-et 



If signaled from the. firing 
li^-e to the re n r 

Ammunition required 

Am about to charge if no in- 
structions to the contrary 

Cease firing 

Double time or "rush" 

Commence firing 

Fix ba onets 

Artillerv fire is causing us losses 

Preparing to move forward 

Halt 

Negative 

Left 

What is the (R. N., etc.)? 
Interrogatory 



What is the (R. 
Interrogatory 



Affirmative 

Acknowledgment 

Range 

Right 

Sunoort needed 

Svs^end firing 



N., etc.)? 



Carrying signal flag. I will always carry the pre- 
scribed signal flags in the field. 

Fix bayonets. If the command to fix bayonets is 
sounded I will repeat it. 

The charge. When the order to charge is sounded 
I will at once repeat it. 

Teamwork. I realize the importance of TEAM- 
WORK in the military business, and I appreciate the 
force of what is said on the subject in the last subpara- 
graph of Par. 116. Therefore, in battle, in camp, on 
the march, and at all other times I will faithfully and 
willingly carry out the orders of the company com- 
mander, and will comply with his known wishes and 
desires. I will also obey as much of the field orders of 
the privates as apply to me. 



[104] 



116 
116. Privates 

In Battle 

My battle orders are — 

Loading pieces. Having once loaded my piece, I 
will, by inserting fresh clips when the magazine is ex- 
hausted, keep it loaded without further command until 
the command unload or inspection arms is given. ( Par. 
134, I. D. R.) 

Straggling. I will not straggle, nor will I under 
any circumstances skulk, but, at the command to ad- 
vance, I will always do so at once. 

Advancing and halting. In advancing by rushes, 
or any other way, I will always endeavor to be the first 
man to start the advance, and also the first man to drop 
down at the signal or command to halt. If not right up 
on the line when I drop down, I will get there by crawl- 
ing. I am aware of the fact that in advancing by rushes 
the last men to reach the new position are exposed to the 
enemy's fire that much longer, and, consequently, are 
more apt to get hit than the others. 

Not to carry wounded. I will not endeavor to 
carry any wounded to the rear. That is the business of 
the litter-bearers. My business is to remain on the firing 
line and help with my rifle. 

Changing sight. I will not fail to change my sight 
when new ranges are announced, nor will I forget to 
change my sight when advancing by rushes, whether or 
not the new range is announced. 

Replenishing ammunition supply. I will never 
lose an opportunity to replenish my ammunition supply 
from the belts of the dead and wounded. The time may 

[105] 



116 (contd.) 

come before the fight is over when ammunition will be 

worth a hundred times its weight in gold. 

Husbanding ammunition. Especially in the first 
stages of a fight, I will husband my ammunition, and 
not w r aste anj^ of it by reckless firing ; for, it is impossible 
to say what may develop later on. 

Rate of fire. In the absence of any other instruc- 
tions from my company commander, squad, or platoon 
leader, I will, if I have received suitable training in 
target practice and the target is a good one, fire ordi- 
narily at about the following rate: 

200 yards] 10 shots 500] 7.5 shots 800] 5 shots 

300 yards }> per 6*00 j- per 900}- per 

•100 yardsj minute 700J minute 1000J minute 

Greater range than 1000 yards, 3 shots per minute. 

If the target should be especially favorable, because 
of its size and conspicuousness, I will exceed the above 
rates of fire. However, on the other hand, if the target 
is very indistinct, or if I have not received suitable train- 
ing in target practice, I will fire at a less rate than stated 
above, not exceeding about 6 shots per minute at the 
closest ranges. (Par. 209, Small- Arms Firing Manual.) 

Notifying squad leader of ammunition left. When 
I have only 100 rounds of ammunition left, I will so 
notify my squad leader, and I will notify him again when 
I have only 50 left. 

Use of rest. I will use a rest for my rifle whenever 
I can. It will improve my shooting. 

Prompt obedience to orders. I will obey at once 
all the commands and orders of my squad leader, and 
my platoon leader. 

[106] 



116 (contd.) 
In case of surprise, excitement, or confusion. In 

case of surprise, excitement, or confusion, I will at once 
listen for the orders of my officers and noncommissioned 
officers, and I will obey them immediately and implicitly, 

Cover. I will take advantage of cover, but, if by so 
doing, I cannot see the enemy, I will then get where I 
can see him ; for, it is much more important that I should 
be able to see the enemy so as to shoot at him, than it is 
for me to conceal myself from his sight. I will always 
take special pains to avoid the sky-line (the tops of hills 
and ridges ) ; for, a man on the sky-line looms up as a 
clear, distinct target. 

Conduct on firing line. When on the firing line, 
I will be on the lookout for signals and orders from my 
squad leader; I will exercise proper care in setting my 
sights and delivering my fire; I will aim deliberately; 
if necessary to fire rapidly, I will do so by loading as 
rapidly as I can, and not by hurrying through the aim- 
ing, which I will always do deliberately; I will observe 
the enemy carefully, increase my fire when the target is 
favorable, and cease firing when the enemy disappears: 
I will not neglect a target because it is not very distinct. 

Fire distribution. I realize that it is of the greatest 
importance that the fire of my platoon should be dis- 
tributed over the entire target assigned to the platoon; 
for, any part of the target not covered by fire represents 
a number of the enemy who are permitted to fire at us 
coolly and effectively. In other words, all parts of the 
target assigned my platoon are equally important. 
Therefore, in order to insure proper fire distribution, I 
will always fire at that part of the target which corre- 

[107] 



116 (contd.) 

sponds to the position I am occupying in my platoon. 
That is to say, if in the center of my platoon, I will fire 
at the center of the target ; if on the right of my platoon, 
I will fire at the right (as I face it) of the target; if in 
the right center of my platoon, I will fire at the right 
center (as I face it) of the target, etc. This is repre- 
sented by the following diagram, the points A', B', C, 
etc., representing the parts of the hostile target at which 
the men occupying the positions A, B, C, etc., in the 
platoon, would fire: 

(Target assigned to platoon) 
A* B' C 1 D 1 E» F 1 g 1 



v \ 

\ \ 

\ \ 
\ \ 

\ \ 



\ 
\ 






/ 



i 
/ 

/ / 



/ / 

1 / 



\\\ \ I ( / 

ABC D E P 
(Platoon) 

Fig. 2 

Shooting at officers. (Sharpshooters and expert 
riflemen.) I will be on the lookout for the enemy's 
officers and will fire at every one I see. 

Orders from squad leader. When firing on the 
firing line I will keep my eyes on the target, and will obey 
promptly all commands received from my squad leader, 
who is the one to give me orders when I am firing on the 
firing line. 

[108] 



116 (contd.) 

Long blast of whistle. When firing on the firing 
line I will AT ONCE suspend firing upon hearing a 
LONG blast of my company commander's whistle or 
my platoon leader's whistle. 

Signals from squad leader. With the exception of 
the LONG whistle blast given by the company com- 
mander or platoon leader, I will pay no attention to 
signals of anyone except to those of my squad leader. 

Ammunition in bandoleers. I will use the ammuni- 
tion in bandoleers first. I will keep thirty (30) rounds 
in the right pocket section of my belt as a reserve to be 
used only when ordered by an officer. (Par. 551, 
Infantry Drill Regulations. ) 

Reenforcing firing line. When reenforcing the 
firing line I will find out at once the range and target 
from the men already there. 

Separation from squad. I will at all times make 
every possible effort not to get separated from my squad, 
but should I unavoidably become separated, I will im- 
mediately try to rejoin it. Should I fail in this, I will 
then join the nearest squad and put myself under the 
orders of its leader. Should I not be able to do this, and 
thus find myself without a leader for the time being, I 
will not lose my head, but will go on fighting on my own 
hook, remembering that the only way for us to win the 
battle is for each and every man to fight, fight, FIGHT 
for all that he is worth. To give up fighting will only 
make it just that much easier for the enemy to kill me 
and my comrades. 

If squad leader is killed. In case my squad leader 
is killed or wounded or becomes separated from the 

[109] 



116 (contd.) 

squad, if I am the oldest soldier in the squad, I will at 
once assume command of it, and will take the proper 
position of squad leader. 

Fixing bayonets. When the order or signal is given 
to fix bayonets, if I was in the front rank before deploy- 
ment, I will at once suspend firinq", quickly fax bayonet, 
and immediately resume firing. If I was in the rear rank 
before deployment, I will increase my rate of fire while 
the man on my right is fixing his bayonet, so that there 
will be no decrease in our volume of fire, and as soon as 
he has fixed his bayonet and commenced to fire, I will 
at once suspend firing, quickly fix bavonet and immedi- 
ately resume firing. (Based on Par. 318, Infantry Drill 
Regulations.) 

Charging. At the order or signal to charge, I will 
spring forward shouting, running with my bayonet at 
charge, and will close in with the enemv, vising mv bayo- 
net with aggressiveness and vigor. (Par. 319, Infantry 
Drill Regulations. ) 

After the charge. After the charge, if separated 
from my squad, I will endeavor to locate it at once, and if 
I can't find it, I will promptly join some other squad, one 
of my own company, if possible. 

Teamwork. I realize that in the struggle of battle, 
like in any other contest in which a number of people are 
taking part, TEAMWORK is absolutely necessary to 
success. By TEAMWORK, I mean cooperation — 
each man doing everything he can to help out those above 
him, by carrying out their wishes and orders promptly, 
willingly, loyally, and efncientlv, and by doing of his 
own accord and initiative anything that will help to 

[HOT 



117 

accomplish the object that he knows those above him are 
trying to accomplish. Therefore, appreciating as I do 
the great value and importance of TEAMWORK, I 
will always bear it in mind, and will never let a chance go 
by without contributing my share to TEAMWORK in 
my company. 

117. Night Operations 

My orders in night operations are : 

Not making noise. On marches and elsewhere I 
will not talk or make other noise, but will preserve abso- 
lute silence. 

No smoking. I will not smoke nor strike matches, 
because the light might be seen by the enemy. 

Alertness for signals and orders. I will be con- 
stantly on the lookout for signals and orders from my 
officers and noncommissioned officers, and I will obey 
at once all signals and orders. 

Firing. Under no circumstances will I ever fire in 
a night operation unless ordered by a superior, or unless 
I am placed in a position where I must fire in order to 
give the alarm. 

If ordered to fire, I will either kneel, sit, or lie down 
and will be sure to hold my piece parallel to the ground, 
so as not to fire high. I will tie a piece of white cloth 
around the muzzle of my rifle to assist me in sighting. 

Bayonet. I realize that firing is of but little value 
in night attacks, and that we must depend upon the 
bayonet, which should be used aggressively and vigorous- 
ly, and that is how I am going to use mine. 



[in] 



118 

118. On Outpost 

My orders as a sentry on outpost are: 

Number of post. The number of my post (if any) 

is No , of Outguard No If when posted I 

am not told the number of my post and outguard I will 
ask for them. 

Adjoining outguards and sentinels. Outguard 

No , is on my right, and No , on my left. 

The next sentinel on my right is posted. . . . (indicate 
where he is posted), and the next sentinel on my left is 
posted. . . . (indicate where he is posted). 

If when I am posted I am not given the numbers of 
the adjoining outguards and told where the sentinels on 
my right and left are posted, I will ask for the informa- 
tion. 

Location of support. The support of this outguard 

is located (define location). If when posted 

I am not told the location of the support of my out- 
guard, I will ask for it. 

Line of retreat. If compelled to fall back, I will 

retreat (state line of retreat) . If when posted 

I am not told by what line to retreat if compelled to fall 
back, I will ask to be informed. 

Location of own troops in front. ( If any. ) There 

are advance detachments in front of me, located as 

follows : ( give exact location ) , and of 

our patrols are operating in my front. 

Friendly patrols crossing outpost line. Should 
any of our patrols attempt to cross the outpost line near 
me without telling me who they are, where they are 
going, about how long they expect to be out, and by 

[112] 



118 (contd.) 
what way they will return, I will halt them and get this 
information before allowing them to proceed. 

What is known of enemy. The enemy is (or is 

supposed to be) (define location as accurately 

as possible) and if he approaches, it is thought he will do 

so by way of (state direction from which the 

enemy is expected) . 

Villages, mountains, etc., in sight. I know the 
names of all the villages, mountains, streams, and other 
prominent features in sight. The village over yonder 
(pointing) is. ... ; that high mountain there (pointing) 
is called . . . . , etc. 

Where roads lead to. I know where all the roads 
in sight lead to. For example, that road (pointing) leads 
to. , . . ; this other road (pointing) goes to. . . ., etc. 

Constant alertness. I will be constantly on the 
alert, watching to the front and flank, and will pay 
special attention to unusual or suspicious noises or oc- 
currences. 

Concealment. I will always conceal myself from 
view. If there is no natural means of concealment, I will 
place branches, twigs, or other suitable material in front 
of me. 

What to do if enemy appears. If I see any indica- 
tions of the enemy, I will at once notify the outguard 
commander. In case of great and immediate danger or 
in case of attack, I will give the alarm by firing my piece 
rapidly. I will always make up my mind beforehand 
just exactly what else I would do in case the enemy 
should approach, and if there is any doubt at all in my 
mind about what I should do, I will ask the commander 
of my outpost. 



118 (contd.) 

Persons allowed to pass. Officers, noncommis- 
sioned officers, and detachments that I recognize as parts 
of the outposts, and officers that I know have authority 
to do so, will be allowed to pass in and out of the out- 
post line. I will detain all others and notify the com- 
mander of the outguard. 

Firing upon persons failing to halt. I will fire upon 
individuals or detachments who fail to halt, or otherwise 
disobey me after a second warning, or sooner, if they 
attempt to attack or escape. 

Deserters. I will halt deserters approaching, order 
them to lay down their arms, and notify the commander 
of the outguard. I will order deserters pursued by the 
enemy to drop their arms and will at once notify the com- 
mander of the outguard. Should deserters fail to lay 
down their arms after a second warning, I will fire upon 
them. 

Flags of truce. I will halt bearers of flags of truce, 
cause them to face about, and will notify the commander 
of the outguard. 

Saluting. I will salute only when I address, or am 
addressed by officers. 

Challenging at night. At night I will allow persons 
to approach fairly close before challenging, and I will 
challenge in a low voice so as not to reveal my position 
to any of the enemy that may be around. In case I have 
been instructed to use prearranged signals, such as strik- 
ing the butt of rifle so many times, whistling, etc., I will, 
of course, use such signals instead of challenging by word 
of mouth. 



[114] 



118 (contd.) 
Firing at night. I will never fire at night unless I 

can clearly see the enemy and I am sure I can hit him, 

or unless it be absolutely necessary to fire in order to 

give the alarm. 1 

What to do if in doubt. In case of doubt as to what 

to do, I will call for the commander of the outguard. 

Advance and Rear Guards 

My orders when acting as a connecting file of an advance 
or rear guard are — 

Looking out for signals. I will be on the constant 
lookout for signals, which I will always transmit at once. 
I will transmit only such signals as I may actually receive 
and no others. For example, I will not transmit the 
signal to halt or advance just because another connect- 
ing file halts or starts to walk, but will wait until I get 
the actual signal to halt or to advance before passing 
it on. 

Taking distances. Whether I take and keep my 
distance from the front or the rear, will depend on 
whether the march is regulated on the main body or on 
the support or reserve of the advance guard. I will 
always take and keep my distance from the body on 
which the march is regulated. If the officer or the non- 
commissioned officer who sends me out as a connecting 
file, does not tell me on which body the march is to be 
regulated, I will ask him. 

Keeping up connection. A connecting file is so 
called because it "connects," — that is, it connects the ele- 
ment that precedes it with the element that follows it. 

1 Tt is said that in the French Arniv in A'geria there is a rule that an^ sentry 
who fires at night, must either produce a corrse. nr be able to show b" blood ma^ks 
that he hit the person fired at. If he can do neither, he is court-martialed for giving 
a false alarm. 

[115] 



118 (contd.) 

I know that in order to do this it is necessary that the 
connecting file should be able to see both the preceding 
and the following elements all the time or very nearly 
all the time, losing sight of either element only when it 
is unavoidable and then for no longer than is absolutely 
necessary. Therefore, I will at all times try to keep in 
sight the elements that I am expected to connect. For 
example, in the case of a bend in the road, I will take a 
position on the outer side of the road, so as to keep in 
view both the preceding and the following elements as 
long as possible and will then run forward so as to resume 
my proper distance from the connecting file or body 
ahead of me. Also, when the column halts, if I am not 
already in a position where I can see both elements 
between which I am acting as connecting file, I will, if 
possible, place myself in such position, and will keep on 
the constant lookout for signals from both elements. 
Again, in the case of a bend in the road it might, in some 
cases, be necessary for me to leave the road a few yards 
in order to keep in view of the preceding and the fol- 
lowing elements. Furthermore, should I receive a signal 
from one body when I cannot see the other, I will at once 
run to a position from which I can see the other and 
transmit the signal. In short, I will use initiative and 
common sense to keep in sight of the two elements that 
I am expected to connect, and at the same time maintain 
as nearly as possible the proper distances between myself 
and these elements. 



cue] 



119-120 

119. Patrolling 

My orders when patrolling are : 

If sick before starting. If I feel sick before start- 
ing, or am weak from recent illness or other cause, I will 
so notify the patrol leader before the patrol starts. 

Accouterments. I will see that my rifle and other 
accouterments are in good, serviceable condition, and 
that there is nothing about me that shines or rattles. 

Ammunition. I will have the proper amount of 
ammunition before starting. 

Not to carry papers of value to enemy. I will be 
sure not to have in my possession any maps or papers that 
might be of value to the enemy. 

Filling canteen. I will fill my canteen before 
starting. 

Conduct. Regarding concealment, avoidance of the 
skyline, alertness, etc., I will carry out the instructions 
given in Part II, page 29, on Scouting and Patrolling. 

120. On the March 

My orders on the march are : 

Filling canteen. I will fill my canteen before the" 
march starts. 

Shoes. I will never go on a march with a pair of 
new, unbroken shoes. I will always wear serviceable, 
broken shoes that fit properly, with good shoe laces. 

Socks. I will make it a special point to wear socks 
that fit properly and that have no holes or rough seams. 

Foot powder. If I have blisters, or get them easily, 
I will sprinkle the inside of my socks and shoes well with 
Talcum or foot powder before starting. 

[117] 



120 (contd.) 

Care of feet. As marching constitutes the principal 
occupation of troops in campaign, I realize the great 
importance of a soldier being able to march, and, there- 
fore the importance of looking after his feet. I will, 
therefore, at all times take the best possible care of my 
feet, carrying out faithfully the instructions received 
from my company commander about caring for the feet. 

Not to leave ranks without permission. Whether 
sick, or whether to get water, or for any other reason, I 
will never leave ranks without permission of my company 
commander, and during halts I will not leave the im- 
mediate vicinity of the company without permission. 

Relieving one's self during halts. Should I wish 
to relieve myself when the company halts, I will do so as 
soon as the halt is made and not wait until it is nearly 
over. 

Not to straggle. Under no circumstances will I 
ever straggle, but I will always keep my proper place in 
the column. 

Eating. I will not eat on the march. 

Drinking water. Before starting on a march I will 
thoroughly quench my thirst. On the march I will not 
drink any more water than I have to in order to replace 
the loss by perspiration. No matter how thirsty I may 
be, or how plentiful the water may be, I will drink only 
a few small swallows at a time. Water that is drunk is 
absorbed at once into the blood, and if the amount is 
excessive, a strain is imposed upon the heart that is likely 
to result in faintness or muscular cramps. 

Not to sit on damp ground. I will not sit on damp 
ground during halts. I will always place a board, twigs, 

[118] 



121 

grass, or something else on damp ground before sitting 
on it. 

Resting during halts. At every halt I will at once 
sit down and rest, removing my pack, or loosening it, 
and resting my back against it on the ground. 

Not to enter yards, houses, etc. I will not enter 
yards, orchards, or gardens, during halts, nor will I ever 
enter a house unless invited to do so by the occupants. 

Falling in promptly. When the command is given 
to fall in after a halt, I will fall in promptly. 

121. In Camp 

My orders in camp are: 

Leaving camp. Upon going into camp I will not 
leave until I have found out from the First Sergeant 
what the orders are about leaving camp. 

Bathing. I will bathe daily, if possible, and will pay 
special attention to the care of my feet. 

Dry clothing. If my clothing is wet, I will always 
change into dry clothing when possible. 

Resting. After bathing and after eating I will get 
all the rest I can. 

Camp sanitation. Camp sanitation — that is, what 
we must do to take care of the health in camp, is of the 
greatest importance, and I will, therefore, do my share 
toward preserving the health and promoting the com- 
fort of those in camp by faithfully observing the fol- 
lowing : 

I will do all I can to prevent the existence of con- 
ditions that will cause stinks and be favorable to the 
breeding of flies and mosquitoes, the two great carriers 
of disease. 

[119] 



122 

I will do my part to keep my tent, the ground around 
it, and the company street clean. Therefore, I will not 
throw food, slop water, rags, paper, empty tin cans, or 
other trash and refuse on the ground, but will put them 
in the box, can, or other receptacle provided for the 
purpose or throw them into the kitchen incinerator (the 
place prepared for the burning of trash and refuse) . 

I will not defile the company street or camp grounds 
by spitting, blowing my nose, urinating, or moving my 
bowels thereon. 

I will use the urinal tub at night and the latrine by 
day. If an open trench is used as a sink, I will always 
cover my excrement with dirt. If the sink is inclosed 
by a box with stool-covers, I will always put the cover 
down as soon as I am through, so as to keep the flies out. 

I will keep the inside of my tent dry and free from 
odors — so, in pleasant weather I will always have my 
tent walls raised, and will air my blankets and extra 
clothing often. 

I will clean my clothes daily as thoroughly as the 
means at hand will permit. In the absence of means to 
wash clothing, I will frequently expose my soiled clothes 
to the sun, which is an excellent germ killer. 

As soon as my tent is pitched I will ditch it, and in 
case of rain, I will loosen the guy ropes to prevent the 
pegs from pulling out and the tent falling down. 

No liquor in camp. I will not introduce liquor 
into camp. 

122. Messages 

Concealing message. I will always conceal in the 
cuff of my shirt or elsewhere any written message that 
I may be carrying. 

J J ° [120] 



123 
Disposition of message, if captured. If captured, 
I will try to destroy the message the very first chance I 
get. 

Understanding verbal messages. When I am 
given a verbal message by a noncommissioned officer to 
carry, I will always repeat the message to the noncom- 
missioned officer before leaving, to see that I understand 
it, and as I am leaving I will go over the message several 
times in mv own mind. If given a messao-e bv an officer, 
and not directed bv him to repeat it, I will before leaving 
ask, for instance, "Mav I repeat the message so as to be 
sure that I understand it?" and, as I am leaving, I will 
go o^er the message several times in my own mind. 
123. In General 

Compliance with orders, etc. In battle, in c^mn, 
on the march, and at all other times, I will comolv f aith- 
fnllv with all the orders, the known wishes and desires of 
the r^rnmnv por^mander. 
What to do if caotured. 

(a) If I see I am P'oinoc to be c q ntured. I will, if 
possible, thmw awqv the bolt of mv ri^e, and ammuni- 
tion, a no 1 sbon]rl I have field glasses in my possession, 
I will bre^V tnp lenses. 

(h) Should I be taken nrisonpr, I will not. under 
anv piTvnrnctqnees civp pr >v information about onr t^ooos, 
ano* cboiTlol J ne comnell^d to flnqwpr onpQtions. I w ill onve 
iyiislpadino" answers. INTor will I t«lk with *nv of onr men 
abo^t our own trnn-ns, what we w^re doino* wb^n can- 
f 1ir pf{, etc.. b^^se t^e chances are the pnemv or pomp of 
their snies will overhear mv conversation. I will take 
advantage of the first oooortnnitv to m*ke mv es^ane 
and s-et back to our trooos with all the information that 
I can get about the enemy. 

[121] 



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Five Tactical Principles and Uniform Tactical Training 

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